Spratlys - Nansha Islands of China

11. MARITIME JURISDICTION IN THE THREE CHINA SEAS:
OPTIONS FOR EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT
http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/publications/policy_papers/pp19.txt
IGCC Policy Paper 19:
===================================================
11. MARITIME JURISDICTION IN THE THREE CHINA SEAS: 
OPTIONS FOR EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT
 =================================================

BY: JI GUOXING

----------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY

The three China Seas (the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South 
China Sea) are all enclosed or semi-enclosed and studded with so many 
offshore and mid-ocean islands that nowhere does the distance from one 
headland or island to another approach 400 nautical miles. With the 
extension of national jurisdiction over maritime resources, no seabed in the 
area is left unclaimed. 

     China has maritime jurisdictional disputes with other coastal states 
bordering on the China Seas. The disputes include continental shelf 
demarcation disputes with North Korea, South Korea, and Japan in the 
Yellow and East China Seas; territorial disputes over the Senkaku 
(Diaoyudao) Islands with Japan in the East China Sea; maritime 
delimitation disputes with Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin (The Beibu Gulf);  
and disputes over the Spratly (Nansha) Islands with Southeast Asian 
countries in the South China Sea.

     The controversies involve two dimensions: territorial sovereignty over 
islands, and relevant jurisdictional rights and interests in maritime 
demarcation. The territorial disputes are a legacy of history, and the 
demarcation disputes are mainly due to differing interpretations of the law 
of the sea.

     Beyond their historical roots, existing disputes are primarily related to oil 
resources. Disputes in the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea have 
intensified since oil reserves were reported in the areas in the late 1960s, and 
disputes in the South China Sea, which had been relatively tranquil for 
hundreds of  years, have emerged mainly since the 1973 oil crisis. 
Additionally, the disputes are related to the strategic location of the islands 
concerned, straddling major regional sea lanes.

     In the post-Cold War Asia Pacific, economic development is the 
primary task for all regional countries. As demand for marine resources 
becomes more and more pressing, new approaches are needed for a 
negotiated settlement of these problems. Disputing parties must cooperate 
in seeking an equitable solution. There could be three options for the 
settlement of maritime jurisdictional disputes in the three China Seas:

     Option one is that each claimant make due adjustments to its claims and 
negotiate for an equitable solution on the boundary delimitation in a spirit of 
compromise and accommodation. With the 1982 UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea in effect, all sides now have a common and unified criterion 
to guide respective adjustments, and can negotiate taking related Convention 
stipulations as starting points.

     Option two is to work for joint development in the disputed areas. 
Though this is only an expedient measure in the transitional period towards 
the final equitable settlement, it is indeed a practical and feasible approach, 
and the only alternative to no action.  All parties could reap the benefits 
from the resources pending the final boundary settlement. What is meant by 
joint development is that the contracting parties are prepared to shelve the 
disputes within a specified period by making certain concessions and that 
the establishment of the joint development area would not affect the stand 
adopted by either country on the permanent delimitation of their maritime 
boundaries. The countries could continue to negotiate the boundary during 
the period of joint development. Besides, it would induce investors who 
would otherwise be dissuaded from investing due to the risks of economic 
and political instability resulting from the jurisdictional disputes over the 
areas in question.

     Option three is to accept third-party assistance for the settlement of the 
disputes when the issues are deadlocked and when there is no hope of a 
compromise between the claimant States themselves.

     Based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, all claimants 
concerned should reconsider their own and others' interests, and make due 
adjustments in their claims. The principle of equity is of substantial 
importance in maritime delimitation, and every maritime delimitation 
should ensure an equitable solution. The interests of all relevant parties in 
the disputes should be taken into consideration. Negotiation and  concession 
are much needed, and third-party mediation, after all, should not be 
excluded as one way of achieving the solution. The negotiation process 
could start from cases easier to handle before proceeding to difficult cases. 
Comparatively speaking, the disputes in the Yellow Sea and the East China 
Sea are simpler than those in the South China Sea. 

     Since the sovereignty issue is difficult to tackle, joint development of 
resources could be taken first as a transitional measure towards the final 
settlement. As all parties are supportive of the idea of joint development, it 
is time to work out concrete and practical steps towards that end.

     No matter which option is taken by the claimants on the way towards the 
settlement of the disputes, all parties should be jointly committed to 
maintain the status quo by refraining from any military and economic 
activities so as not to further complicate the situation,  to renounce the use of 
force to avoid confrontation, and to guarantee the security and freedom of 
navigation in the sea-lanes in these seas. 

===================================================
CONTENTS
===================================================

INTRODUCTION

THE EXISTING DISPUTES

ANALYSES OF THE DISPUTES

EQUITABLE APPROACHES IN EXISTING INTERNATIONAL 
MARITIME BOUNDARY AGREEMENTS

OPTIONS FOR EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT

===================================================
FIGURES
===================================================

FIGURE 1: THE YELLOW SEA

FIGURE 2: THE EAST CHINA SEA

FIGURE 3: THE GULF OF TONKIN

FIGURE 4: THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND SPRATLEY ISLANDS

===================================================
Introduction
===================================================

The three China Seas (the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South 
China Sea) are all enclosed or semi-enclosed and studded with so many 
offshore and mid-ocean islands that nowhere does the distance from one 
headland or island to another approach 400 nautical miles (nm). With the 
extension of national jurisdiction over maritime resources, no seabed area in 
the three China Seas is left unclaimed. 

     China, a coastal country bordering on the three China Seas, has maritime 
jurisdictional disputes with adjacent and opposite coastal states. These 
include continental shelf demarcation disputes with North Korea, South 
Korea, and Japan in the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea; territorial 
disputes over the Senkaku (Diaoyudao) Islands with Japan in the East 
China Sea; maritime delimitation disputes with Vietnam in the Gulf of 
Tonkin (The Beibu Gulf);  and disputes over the Spratly (Nansha) Islands 
with some Southeast Asian countries in the South China Sea.

     The controversies involve two dimensions: territorial sovereignty over 
islands, and relevant jurisdictional rights and interests in maritime 
demarcation. The territorial disputes are a legacy of history, and the 
demarcation disputes are mainly due to differing interpretations of the law 
of the sea.

     Under the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention (which was negotiated 
from 1973 to 1982 and entered into force after 1994), a coastal state may 
lay claim to at least 200 nm (370.4 km) of jurisdiction, whether the claim is 
based on a continental shelf or an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Islands, 
with the exception of "rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or 
economic life of their own," are considered to have continental shelves and 
EEZs in the same way as land territories. 

     Though these entitlements would theoretically benefit coastal states, they 
clearly complicate boundary issues in the three China Seas. Given the 
geography of the China Seas, continental shelf claims, in and of themselves, 
already create complex jurisdictional problems; when islands can be used to 
generate further jurisdictional claims on the continental shelf, the problems 
become even more complex.

     Although historically rooted, existing disputes are driven primarily by 
regional interests in oil resources that may lie under the seas. In the three 
China Seas, many of the overlapping claims or unresolved boundaries 
involve basins with good petroleum potential. The disputes in the Yellow 
Sea and the East China Sea have intensified since oil reserves were reported 
in the areas in the late 1960s, and the disputes in the South China Sea, 
which had been relatively tranquil for hundreds of  years, have emerged 
mainly since the 1973 oil crisis.

     Additionally, the disputes are related to the strategic location of the 
islands concerned. The Senkaku Islands straddle the sea-lanes in the East 
China Sea, and the Spratly Islands straddle the major sea-lanes between the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans.

     Recent events in the China Seas are illustrative of the explosiveness of 
these disputes and their capacity to shatter peace and stability in the Asian-
Pacific region. The first of these was an armed clash on 14 March 1988 
between China and Vietnam in Gac Ma Reef (Chigua Jiao) in the Spratlys, 
where one Vietnamese freighter was sunk and two Vietnamese ships were 
severely damaged. 

     The second event was a sharp increase in tension which erupted over the 
Senkaku Islands following the Japan Maritime Safety Agency's 
'authorizing' the construction of a lighthouse on one of the islands as an 
official marine beacon on 1 October 1990. The next day, Japan intercepted 
attempts by Taiwanese sportsmen and politicians to run a torch relay to 
reinforce Taiwan's claims to the islands, arousing protests from Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and Macao.

     In July, 1994 a tense face-off began when Vietnam began drilling in a 
concession China had granted to the U.S. Crestone Energy Corporation, 
and Chinese ships blocked the drilling rig.

     In a dispute over the Mischief Reef between China and the Philippines, 
in early 1995 China built structures on the reef; Manila then blew up 
Chinese sovereignty stone markers over a number of other reefs and shoals, 
and detained 62 Chinese fishermen.

     In the post-Cold War Asia Pacific, economic development is the 
primary task for all regional countries. As demand for marine resources has 
become more and more pressing, new approaches are needed for a 
negotiated settlement of such disputes. Disputing parties must cooperate in 
seeking an equitable solution in a spirit of compromise and mutual 
accommodation, beginning with a gradual process of negotiated solutions.

     Based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, all claimants 
concerned should reconsider their own and others' interests, and make due 
adjustments in their claims. The principle of equity is of substantial 
importance in maritime delimitation, and every maritime delimitation 
should ensure an equitable solution. The interests of all relevant parties in 
the disputes should be taken into consideration. Negotiation and  concession 
are much needed, and third-party mediation, after all, should not be 
excluded as one way of achieving the solution. The negotiation process 
could start from cases easier to handle before proceeding to difficult cases. 
Comparatively speaking, the disputes in the Yellow Sea and the East China 
Sea are simpler than those in the South China Sea. 

     Since the sovereignty issue is difficult to tackle, joint development of 
resources could be taken first as a transitional measure towards the final 
settlement. As all parties are supportive of the idea of joint development, it 
is time to work out concrete and practical steps towards that end.

===================================================
THE EXISTING DISPUTES
===================================================

----------------------------------------------------
THE YELLOW SEA

With an area of about 400,000 square kilometers, the Yellow Sea is 
enclosed by Korea on the east and by China on the west and north. Its basin 
has been estimated to contain anywhere from one to ten billion barrels of 
oil.&lt;1&gt; Moreover, it is one of the rare regions where fishing is possible in 
virtually all seasons. Largely as a result of such potentials, disputes in the 
Yellow Sea involve the demarcation of the continental shelf between China 
and North Korea, and between China and South Korea. (Figure 1) The 
Yellow Sea basin is shallow; depths average 55 meters and nowhere exceed 
125 meters. Sea bed sedimentary subsoil analysis shows that the eastern 
third is floored by sands derived from Korean mountains, and that the 
remaining two-thirds on the west side are derived from the clay brought 
down by Chinese rivers.

     Vis-a-vis North Korea, China claims most of the intervening Yellow 
Sea continental shelf based on the principle of the natural prolongation of 
land territory.&lt;2&gt; As "the Yellow River in China washes down into the 
Yellow Sea 15,000 million cubic yards of sediments every year,"&lt;3&gt; and 
as the silt line divides the clayey sediments coming from China from those 
sands derived from Korea, China specifically claims the continental area 
extending to the silt line, and further weights its claim by extension from 
Haiyang Island lying 43 nm off the Liaodong Peninsula. Within the Bay of 
Korea (in the northern part of the Yellow Sea), China upholds an 
equidistant line as the demarcation between the two countries.

     North Korea and South Korea adopt the median line principle for seabed 
demarcation between them.&lt;4&gt; In announcing its exclusive 200-mile 
economic zone in July 1977, North Korea defined its economic zone outer 
limit based upon 'the half-line of the sea'. In August 1977, North Korea also 
declared a 50-mile military undary zone whose outer limit in the Yellow 
Sea coincides with that of its economic zone. South Korea has staked out 
unilaterally four sea-bed oil tracts in the Yellow Sea based on the median 
line principle, assuming that their seaward limit would constitute the 
boundary of the continental shelf shared with China. 

     In the Korea Bay, oil exploration is proceeding on both sides of what 
would be the median line between China and North Korea. China has 
discovered oil and gas within 50 miles of it; North Korea has drilled test 
wells and discovered oil about 50 km from the western extension of the 
military demarcation line between North and South Korea.

     In the eastern Yellow Sea, the deltaic nature of the sediments is 
promising for further oil prospecting. The broad, interconnected basins in 
central Yellow sea are filled with high organic content sediments, including 
shale, and hence have good source rock characteristics. The land area of 
Subei-South Yellow Sea Basin is a commercial oil and gas producing area; 
and the wells with commercial oil and gas flows are situated mainly in the 
central and western parts of Dongtai Depression.

     For the Bay of Korea Basin, a boundary along the silt line would give 
almost the entire basin to North Korea. However, "if the boundary were the 
equidistance line, most of the basin, including its core would fall to China. 
Only a small pod of 2,000 meters of sediment would lie on the North 
Korean side of the line."&lt;5&gt;  In the Yellow Sea, the central area is 
surrounded by good prospective areas. Using the silt line as a boundary 
would place the entire basin on the Chinese side of the line. "If the boundary 
were the equidistance line, most of the basin would be on the Chinese side, 
but half of a pod, including a tip of the most prospective area, would be on 
the Korean side."&lt;6&gt; Though China claims natural prolongation, it has 
exercised exploratory drilling to its side of a hypothetical median line 
asserted by Korea.

     From a legal point of view, the disputes in the Yellow Sea should be 
easier to be resolved than the others. In the sea areas between China and 
North Korea, not only are the geographical circumstances relatively simpler, 
but also no offshore territory is under dispute between them. It seems to be 
an uncomplicated matter to draw maritime boundaries from the Yalu River.  
"The international boundary along the [watercourse] of the Yalu River 
reaches the sea through the well-marked channel called So Suido."&lt;7&gt;  
Between South Korea and China, there are no contested islands as well to 
complicate delimitation of the continental shelf between them. And 
numerous as the islands are in their offshore areas, they are situated fairly 
close to the coasts, so that their presence alone is not likely to cause serious 
inequity in the boundary delimitation. Furthermore, resolution will be 
facilitated by the fact that China now has diplomatic relations with the two 
Koreas.

     The difficulties in the settlement first lie in the fact that Korea still 
remains under divided leadership between the South and the North and that 
few substantial improvements have been achieved in North-South relations. 
The scenario that the three sides get together for negotiation of their sea 
problems looks unrealistic in the near future. Also, each of them is locked 
in shelf and economic zone boundary problems in other areas contiguous to 
the Yellow Sea. "For this reason, any particular position taken with respect 
to one situation could militate against its own interests in another."&lt;8&gt;  
Third, China and North Korea have been unspecific with respect to the 
baseline from which the demarcation of a median line is to be measured.

----------------------------------------------------
THE EAST CHINA SEA

The East China Sea "is thought to contain 10 to 100 billion barrels of oil 
with up to 10 billion barrels in the (South Korea-Japan) JDZ (Joint 
Development Zone)."&lt;9&gt;  The southern East China Sea has good 
prospects for oil and gas "in its northern two-thirds and in its southwestern 
corner."&lt;10&gt; The disputes there are mainly between China and Japan 
involving continental shelf delimitation and the sovereignty of the Senkaku 
(Diaoyudao) Islands. However, South Korea is also concerned with 
continental shelf delimitation in its northernmost portion. (Figure 2)

     The East China Sea Basin covers about 300,000 square kilometers. It is 
shallow, with water depths of less than 200 m, except in the Okinawa 
Trough along the Japanese the coast. Here the distance between the Chinese 
and Japanese land masses nowhere exceed 400 miles, so that unilateral 
claims naturally overlap.

     China adheres to the natural prolongation of land territory principle, 
holding that "The East China Sea continental shelf is the natural extension 
of the Chinese continental territory. The People's Republic of China has 
inviolable sovereignty over the East China Sea continental shelf."&lt;11&gt;  The 
Chinese continental shelf claim extends all the way to the axis of the 
Okinawa Trough,  enclosing essentially all of the petroleum potential in the 
East China Sea.  However, in its efforts at offshore oil development since 
1980, China has limited its exploration mainly to its side of the Chinese-
Japanese equidistant line. China has prospected for hydrocarbons in the 
western part of the East China Sea, and has drilled successful gas wells 
outside the shelf area contested with Japan and adjacent to an equidistant 
line. "Beijing, asserting the natural prolongation doctrine, advocated the 
creation of joint development zones that would give China a share of the 
resources on the Japanese side of the continental shelf, where the richest 
petroleum resources are believed to be concentrated."&lt;12&gt;

     Japan stands for the equidistant line for its continental shelf, and ignores 
the pivotal Dongdao Island exposed at low tide 70 nautical miles off 
Shanghai. "The equidistance line between the undisputed islands of Japan 
and the Chinese mainland leaves an area of 9,000 nm2 of the Asian 
continental shelf landward of the 200 meter isobath on the Japanese side of 
the line."&lt;13&gt; Thus, a large overlapping area occurs between China's and 
Japan's claims. Though "the Japanese block system extends beyond an 
equidistant line,"&lt;14&gt; (See Figure 2.) Japan has announced it would not 
authorize exploration for petroleum in the disputed area until the matter is 
resolved.

     South Korea, while adhering to the median line principle in the Yellow 
Sea, adheres instead to natural prolongation of land territory in the East 
China Sea, and extends its claims "as far south as 28( 36" of the northern 
latitude, over 250 miles from the nearest Korean territory, considerably 
beyond the 200 meter contour line into the Okinawa Trough" in its mining 
blocks.&lt;15&gt; There is an overlap between Japanese and South Korean 
claims, but they have exercised a joint development zone since 1974. China 
has denounced the joint development agreement as a violation of its rights. 
China says, "It stands to reason that the question of how to divide those 
parts of the continental shelf in the East China Sea involving other countries 
should be decided by China and the related countries through 
consultations."&lt;16&gt; China is now reported to have drilled wells on the 
western end of the joint development zone.

     The existence of the Okinawa Trough  makes the delimitation more 
complicated. The sea-bed in the East China Sea slopes gently from the 
Chinese coast, and to a lesser extent, from the Korean coast, until it drops 
abruptly into the Okinawa Trough whose depth reaches nearly 2,300 meters 
at its deepest. The Okinawa Trough does not follow the Japanese coast 
closely, and is highly irregular. China holds that the Okinawa Trough 
proves that the continental shelves of China and Japan are not connected, 
that the Trough serves as the boundary between them, and that the Trough 
should not be ignored in boundary delimitation. Japan, on the other hand, 
holds that the Trough is just an incidental depression in a continuous 
continental margin between the two countries, that Japan's  200 nm 
continental shelf claim is not affected by it, and that any legal effect of the 
trough should be ignored as a factor in delimiting the East China Sea 
continental shelf.

     Moreover, the ownership of the Senkaku (Diaoyudao) Islands further 
directly affects the boundary delimitation. China and Japan thus both claim 
sovereignty over the islands, and stick to their own arguments. 

     The Senkaku Islands consist of five uninhabited islets and three barren 
rocks, located approximately 120 nautical miles northeast of Taiwan, 200 
nautical miles east of the China mainland coast, and about 200 nautical 
miles southwest of Okinawa. They are all at the edge of the East China Sea 
continental shelf fronting the Okinawa Trough on the south. The depth of 
the surrounding waters is about 100-150 meters, with the exception of a 
deep cleft in the continental shelf just south and east of islands that separates 
them from the Ryukyu Islands. The total land area is about 7 square 
kilometers. The sea areas around the Senkaku Island are rich in fishery 
resources, and are assumed to be rich in oil and gas reserves. Besides, the 
islands are strategically located, straddling the sea-lanes in the East China 
Sea.

     China holds that the Islands "have been an inalienable part of Chinese 
territory since ancient times, and appertain to China's Taiwan";&lt;17&gt; and 
that the seizure by the Japanese government of these islands cannot change 
that historical fact.&lt;18&gt;

     China argues that historically the Islands were discovered and named by 
China hundreds of years before the Ryukyu fisherman Tatsushiro Koga 
discovered them in 1884, as was alleged by Japan. Reference to the Islands 
is found in a number of Chinese writings dating back to the mid-16 century. 

     From the point of usage, the fishing grounds around the Islands have 
been regular haunts of Chinese fishermen, who used the Islands as storm 
shelters as well. In 1893, Empress Dowager Tsu Shih of the Qing Dynasty 
issued an imperial edict granting three islets of the Diaoyudao Islands to one 
of her subjects Sheng Xuanhuai for collecting herbs. This was an official act 
on China's side. China argues that discovery accompanied by some formal 
act of usage is sufficient to establish  sovereignty over the Islands.

     From the point of international treaty, China holds that when Taiwan and 
all the islands appertaining or belonging to it were ceded to Japan in April 
1895 as a  result of China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, the Diaoyudao 
Islands were undoubtedly included in that part of the Chinese territory so 
ceded. Japan's unilateral proclamation of annexation of the Islands in 1895 
can therefore have no legal effect. In 1945 when Japan surrendered to the 
Allies, it accepted the terms as set forth in the Cairo and Potsdam 
Declarations regarding the return of the Chinese territories including the 
Diaoyudao Islands. Regarding the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 
signed by Japan and the Allies, Chapter 2 of the Treaty stipulates that 'Japan 
renounced all rights, title, and claim to Formosa (Taiwan) and the 
Pescadores'.  China, which was not invited to the Peace Conference, 
interprets the name Formosa to include the Diaoyudao Islands.

     Japan holds that the Senkakus are Japanese territory. The Japanese 
arguments are: First, the ownership of the Islands had not been established 
by China, or any other state, up until 1894.  In other words, they were terra 
nullius (land belonging to no country). They were discovered by Ryukyu 
fisherman Tatsushiro Koga in 1884. "It was not until 1895, when the 
Japanese cabinet decided to incorporate part of the islands into the 
Prefecture of Okinawa, that the ownership of the islands was first 
established."&lt;19&gt;  A statement issued by the Japanese Foreign Ministry in 
1972 said, "In and after 1885, the (Japanese) government repeatedly 
conducted field surveys on the Senkaku Islands, and having confirmed with 
prudence that they were not merely uninhabited islands but also had no 
traces of control by Qing (China), made a cabinet decision on January 
14,1895, to the effect that a marker post would be put up in the Islands, and 
thus, decided to incorporate them formally into our country's 
territory."&lt;20&gt;

     Second, Japan insists that the incorporation of the Senkaku Islands was 
unrelated to the successful progress of the war against China, and the 
Islands were not included in the Shimonoseki Treaty signed concluding the 
Sino-Japanese War by which China ceded to Japan Formosa together with 
all islands pertaining to it. Japan asserts that "After the Sino-Japanese War, 
but before the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Islands were formally annexed to 
the Ryukyus."&lt;21&gt;

     Third, the Senkaku Islands were not included in the territories Japan had 
to give up according to the San Francisco Peace Treaty. When the Ryukyu 
Islands were placed under the U.S. military administration at the end of the 
Second World War and subsequently under U.S. trusteeship in accordance 
with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Senkaku Islands were always 
included in the Ryukyu Islands. Besides, the Okinawa Reversion Treaty 
also included the Islands in the areas to be restored.

     To sum up, China holds that the Senkaku Islands were part of its 
territory until April 1895, when they were ceded to Japan after losing a war. 
China believes whatever happened after April 1895 cannot be considered 
relevant in undermining China's long-standing claim.  Japan asserts that the 
Islands belonged to no country until January 1895, when they were 
incorporated into Japanese territory by the cabinet decision. Japan argues 
what happened before January 1895 cannot diminish Japan's sovereignty.

     Besides, there is the controversy over the maritime rights the Senkaku 
Islands are entitled to have. China holds that the Senkaku Islands are small, 
uninhabited, and cannot sustain economic life of their own, and that they are 
not entitled to have continental shelf.  Japan holds that the Islands are 
entitled to have continental shelf, and intends to use them as base points for 
continental shelf claims on the East China Sea. In this case, "Possession of 
the islands would confer on the owner title to over 11,700 nm2 of the Asian 
continental shelf landward of the 200 m isobath." &lt;22&gt; If China owns the 
Senkaku Islands, it would own most of the southern portion of the East 
China Sea Basin, with Japan retaining only the eastern margin of the basin. 
If Japan owns the Senkakus, much more of the basin would fall to it.  "If 
the islands were ignored in a boundary settlement, the southern portion of 
the East China Sea Basin would be split relatively evenly in terms of a real 
extent and sediment thickness."&lt;23&gt;  

     Tension over the Senkakus has occurred now and then during recent 
decades. For example, there was a 'Protect the Diaoyudaos Movement' 
among the Chinese communities in Taiwan, Hong Kong and in major 
metropolitan centers of North America in September 1970; and protests 
against Japan's claims to the Islands by permitting the renovation of a 
lighthouse on one of the islets mounted in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao 
in October 1990.  When relations between China and Japan were 
normalized in 1972, both sides agreed to shelve the disputes. However, 
different interpretations exist in regard to this shelving. The Chinese side 
regards the shelving as a way of maintaining bilateral friendly relations for 
future negotiations; the Japanese side seems to regard more or less the 
shelving as a way of consolidating Japan's present control of the Islands as 
a fait accompli.

     China has proposed to Japan that since the issue of sovereignty over the 
Islands is shelved, they might cooperate in joint studies on exploration and 
development of oil in the sea areas around the Islands, but "Japan, which 
currently controls the Senkakus, is reluctant to acknowledge formally that 
its sovereignty there is uncertain."&lt;24&gt;  Japan appears to have in mind a 
median-line arrangement that would permit oil development to move ahead 
regardless of how the question of title to the Senkakus is settled.

----------------------------------------------------
The Gulf of Tonkin (the Beibu Gulf)

The Gulf of Tonkin is a semi-enclosed gulf embraced by the mainland of 
China and Vietnam as well as China's Hainan Island. Except for the 
announced width of the territorial sea within which China and Vietnam have 
exercised their jurisdiction respectively, the two sides have never delimited 
their sea boundary in the Gulf, and current disputes involve the demarcation 
of that boundary and the differing interpretations of the 1887 Sino-French 
Convention regarding it (Figure 3). In view of the fact that the Gulf 
continental shelf is the natural land extension of both China and Vietnam, 
and that the Gulf is 170 nm wide at the maximum, China and Vietnam 
should share the Gulf's resources.

     In December 1973, a Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister explicitly said, 
"The Tonkin Gulf sea area has not been divided between the two countries 
because Vietnam has been at war all the time."&lt;25&gt; He thus proposed to 
China to hold negotiations on the division of its sea area.  However, when 
the talks started, the Vietnamese side contradicted itself, claiming that the 
sea area in the Tonkin Gulf had long been delimited. Vietnam asserts that 
"The convention between France and the Qing Government of China signed 
in Beijing on 26 June 1887 unmistakably defined the north-south straight 
line to the east of Tra-Co (i.e. longitude 108( 03'13" E) as the sea boundary 
between Vietnam and China in the Tonkin Gulf."&lt;26&gt; It further asserts that 
in the last hundred years or so since the signing of the Convention, the 
French colonial authorities and later the Vietnamese Government has 
consciously and consistently exercised sovereignty and jurisdiction within 
this line. In November 1982, Vietnam reaffirmed the area west of the 
longitude stipulated in the 1887 convention as its "historic internal waters." 
"Vietnam apparently was using the principle of natural prolongation of the 
continental margin to claim Vietnamese jurisdiction over the shelf up to 
China's 12 nm territorial sea boundary."&lt;27&gt;

     China's position on the Gulf's delimitation is based on the principle of 
equidistance. China holds that, in consideration of the geographical features 
of the Tonkin Gulf and the relevant provisions in international law, China 
and Vietnam should share the natural resources of the Tonkin Gulf and 
divide the Gulf between them on a fair and reasonable basis.

     Regarding the Sino-French Convention signed in Beijing on 26 June 
1887 after the Sino-French war in 1885, the stipulations pertinent to the 
boundary in Guangdong section are: "As for the islands in the sea, those to 
the east of the southward red line drawn by the commissioners of the two 
countries, passing through the hill at the east tip of the Tra-Co, belong to 
China, and those to its west, Jiutoushan Island and the other islands, belong 
to Annam."&lt;28&gt; It is obvious that this red line defined by the 1887 
Convention only indicated the ownership of the offshore islands without 
involving the delimitation of the entire Tonkin Gulf. In fact, the term 
"Tonkin Gulf" is not mentioned at all in the Convention, nor is the entire 
"Tonkin Gulf" marked in the map attached to the Convention. As Douglas 
M. Johnston and Mark J. Valencia say, "The text of the 1887 Sino-French 
Convention does use the term 'frontiere', which at that time usually had a 
territorial significance, but a close reading suggests that the purpose was 
functionally restrictive: to divide the islands into administrative zones, not to 
allocate waters or seabed or their resources."&lt;29&gt; Moreover, given the 
circumstances at the time of signing the treaty at the end of the 19th century 
when "the doctrine of free passage on the seas" was prevalent, it was 
inconceivable that China and France should regard the Tonkin Gulf as an 
inland sea and divide it up. Besides, the Convention does not stipulate 
whether the red line has a  northern or southern terminus. "If extended to 
the north, it would intersect the coast of China, and its extension to the south 
intersects the coast of Vietnam between Hue and Da Nang."&lt;30&gt; In its note 
to the Chinese legation in Paris in 1933, the Quai d'Orsay said, among other 
things, that the delimitation line in the 1887 Sino-French Convention 
"should be considered as a local one applicable only to the Mancay area in 
northern Vietnam." Otherwise, the French note said, "The line would cut 
across the central part of Vietnam, making that region and many 
Vietnamese islands part of Chinese territory."&lt;31&gt;

     The Vietnamese assertion that for nearly a hundred years the French 
colonial authorities and later the Vietnamese Government has exercised 
their sovereignty and jurisdiction within the longitude 108( 3' 13" is 
groundless. In December 1926, the French Government declared that its 
1888 law prohibiting foreign vessels from fishing within 3 nm of its 
territorial sea should be applicable to all its colonies. Thus the Law should 
naturally be applicable to the Tonkin Gulf. In September 1964, the 
Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declared the width of 
its territorial sea to be 12 nm and also published a map showing its territory 
sea boundary in the Tonkin Gulf. If the vast sea area in the Tonkin Gulf to 
the west of Longitude 108( 3' 13" were Vietnam's own as is now claimed, 
and if Vietnam had consistently exercised sovereignty and jurisdiction 
within that vast sea area, it is untenable that Vietnam would have drawn a 
sea boundary line within its own inland sea. Thus, the "sea boundary line" 
in the Tonkin Gulf as currently claimed by Vietnam is both historically and 
practically.

     In this dispute, the resource stakes are high. The Tonkin Gulf abounds in 
hydrocarbon resources. Foreign oil companies have been drilling near, if 
not in, the disputed areas. Some U.S., French and Italian companies have 
had agreements with both China and Vietnam in the area. "Chinese crews 
have drilled five wells in the North Bay Basin, and there is a total of nine 
discoveries in eleven wells in the gulf."&lt;32&gt;  The area also has rich fishery. 
For a long time both countries have exploited shared stocks of mackerel 
intensively.

     China has proposed that a rectangular "neutral zone" in the middle of the 
Gulf, bounded by the 18( and 20( parallels and 107( and 108( meridians, be 
kept free from exploration until the two countries could reach agreement on 
the delimitation. China's agreements with Western oil companies for oil 
exploration work off the west coast of Hainan Island have been drawn with 
a western boundary of 108( E, so as not to breach the "neutral zone." 
Vietnam has never accepted this proposal, but has suspended its 
negotiations or agreements with foreign oil companies for exploration of the 
Gulf. Both parties have refrained from exploring or exploiting petroleum in 
the buffer zone.

     The Sino-Vietnamese talks on the Tonkin Gulf have been held 
intermittently since August 1974, and have produced no results. On 20 June 
1993, both sides signed an agreement on the basic principles for resolving 
the land boundaries and the demarcation of the Tonkin Gulf, laying a 
groundwork for peaceful negotiation. 

     Negotiations could be based on the principle of equidistance or that of 
equity. If equidistance is to be used, the island Ile Bach-Long-Vi, 53 m 
above sea level, is important in the delimitation, since its location 38 nm 
from the nearest Vietnamese territory would extend the line of equidistance 
in Vietnam's favor and would allocate an additional 1700 nm2 of maritime 
territory to Vietnam. China might maintain that the location of Ile Bach-
Long-Vi constitutes special circumstances that render a line of equidistance 
inappropriate.  "Discounting Ile Bach-Long-Vi, a line of equidistance, 
which might be reasonable under the equity principle, would be 
advantageous to China."&lt;33&gt;

----------------------------------------------------
The Spratly (Nansha) Islands

The disputes in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea involve five 
countries and six parties, namely, China, China's Taiwan, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. The disputes embrace the sovereignty 
issue over the Spratly Islands, and the delimitation of maritime boundaries 
in the sea areas adjacent to the Spratly Islands in the southern part of the 
South China Sea. (Figure 4)

     The South China Sea is a steep basin abruptly dropping off to abyssal 
plains at the center. "There is virtually no continental shelf along the 
Philippine side, the 200 m isodepth line on the southeast running very 
closely along Palawan and Luzon. Only on the side of the Chinese 
mainland, Taiwan, and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam, is there some breadth of 
continental shelf."&lt;34&gt;

     The Spratly Islands consist of more than 400 islands, banks, reefs, 
shoals, atolls and cays. Among them, 33 rise above the sea, and 7 have an 
area exceeding 0.5 sq. km. They lie scattered over an area of about 400 nm 
from east to west and about 500 nm from north to south. The sea areas 
contained by these islands are 800,000 sq. km or 38 percent of South China 
Sea waters. Until 1960s, much of this area was not accurately surveyed, but 
was portrayed as "Dangerous Ground" on maps.

     The Spratly Islands abound in tropical fish, minerals and other marine 
resources. One study estimates that the South China Sea has a yearly 
harvest of five million tons of fish. The islands also have great potential for 
undersea oil and gas exploitation. Surveys made by China indicate that 
about 25 billion cubic meters of gas and 105 billion barrels of oil exist in the 
continental shelf around the Spratly Islands. Seabed areas near James Shoal 
(Zhengmu Ansha), Spratly Island (Nanwei Dao), and Reed Bank (Liyue 
Tan) are known to have extractable oil fields. The 9,700 sq. mile area 
around Vanguard Bank (Wai'an Tan) is estimated to contain 1 billion 
barrels of oil. Within the sea area of 310,000 sq. km around James Shoal, 
North  and South Luconia Shoals, oil and gas reserves are estimated at 13 
billion to 17 billion tons. In offshore Brunei, oil reserves are estimated at 
1.3-2.0 billion barrels, and proven gas reserves are in the range of 7.7-10 
trillion ft3.  

     Although to develop oil would not be commercially justifiable with 
current technology, due to water depths of up to 2,500 meters, the claimants 
are evidently resource-oriented. The area had been relatively tranquil for 
hundreds of years, and disputes in the main have emerged since the 1973 
oil crisis. Advances in drilling technology and the rising interest of foreign 
companies in searching for petroleum resources in the South China Sea 
have intensified the disputes. What is at stake in the disputes is the oil to be 
found around the islands and in the adjacent continental shelf.

     The Spratly Islands, sitting astride major sea-lanes, are also of great 
strategic significance. The lanes communicate on the southwest with the 
Indian Ocean through Malacca-Singapore Straits, and on the northeast with 
the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. Tension in the area could affect 
the flow of traffic-maritime trade and commerce as well as military 
transport-between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Countries like the U.S. 
and Japan are much concerned about free access through the sea lanes and 
air corridors there.     

     The Islands have been claimed wholly by China and Vietnam, and partly 
by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, based on various historical, 
geographical and legalistic grounds. Except for Brunei, all the claimants 
now have established military presence there, and a jagged, interlocking and 
crazy-quilt pattern of occupation has been formed, making the situation 
tense and explosive. At present, Vietnam has occupied 27 islands and reefs 
in the western and central parts of the archipelago; the Philippines, 8 in the 
eastern part; Malaysia, 3 in the southern part; China, 7 and China's Taiwan, 
1  in the central part.

     The grounds for the claims on the part of China and China's Taiwan are 
the same. China's stand is that that the Spratlys "have always been an 
inalienable part of Chinese territory since ancient times."&lt;35&gt;

     First, China holds that China discovered the islands more than 2,100 
years ago at the time of the Han Dynasty, i.e., hundreds of years before 
Vietnam began asserting its claims, and that China meets the requirements 
of "acquisition by discovery" in accordance with the concept of 
"intertemporal law" in international arbitration and adjudication.     

     Second, China has displayed state authority over the Spratlys since 
Zheng He (Cheng Ho), on behalf of the Ming Court, incorporated the 
Spratlys into China's domain in the early 15th century. In spite of 
geographical limitations for permanent settlement at that time, there has 
been an uninterrupted presence of Chinese on the islands for hundreds of 
years. "In a remote, uninhabited territory the degree of authority actually 
displayed may be relatively small, whereas in a populated area the degree 
must be greater."&lt;36&gt; From the late 19th century to the 1940s, France and 
Japan, covetous of the Spratlys, successively attempted to assert claims on 
the islands, but all without success owning to strong opposition from 
China. 

     Third, as the Spratlys were under the control of the Japanese during the 
Second World War, China was legally restored its sovereignty over the 
Spratlys according to the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty signed on 8 
September 1951. Chapter 2 of the Treaty provides that "Japan renounces all 
right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands." 
Though the Treaty does not stipulate unequivocally that these islands be 
returned to China after renunciation, Japan is implicated in its thinking and 
desire to return these islands to China. The evidence is that in 1952, the year 
after the San Francisco Treaty was signed, the 15th map of Southeast Asia 
of the Standard World Atlas, recommended by the signature of the then 
Japanese Foreign Minister, Cats Okazaki, marks as part of China all the 
Paracel and Spratly islands which Japan had to renounce as stipulated by the 
Peace Treaty.&lt;37&gt; When China took over the Spratly Islands from Japan in 
1946, and published new names for each of the Islands, neither Vietnam 
nor any country protested to China regarding to its actions.     

     Vietnam's stand is also mainly based on historical grounds. The former 
Saigon government, which attended the 1951 San Francisco Peace 
Conference, first affirmed its right to the Spratlys at the conference by 
saying that these islands "have always belonged to Vietnam." After the 
Philippines claimed the islands in 1956, Vietnam renewed its interests in the 
islands and tried to assert its claim. It asserted that "In 1834, under the reign 
of Emperor Minh Mang, the Spratlys appeared in the first Vietnamese map 
as an integral part of the national territory."&lt;38&gt; In September 1973, it 
further announced the formal incorporation of 11 main islands in the 
Spratlys into its Phuc Tuy Province.      The attitude of the Hanoi 
government, which has controlled the whole of Vietnam since the collapse 
of the Saigon government in 1975, has not been consistent in respect of the 
Spratlys. Before 1975, Hanoi officially acknowledged the Spratlys as being 
Chinese territory. Its Vice Foreign Minister Ung Van Khiem stated on 15 
June 1956 to the Chinese Charge d'Affaires Li Zhimin  that "According to 
Vietnamese data, the Xisha (Paracel) and Nansha (Spratly) Islands are 
historically part of Chinese territory."&lt;39&gt;  In September 1958 when China 
proclaimed the breadth of its territorial sea to be 12 nm and specified that 
this provision applies to all Chinese territories including the Spratlys, 
Vietnam's late premier Pham Van Dong in his note to Beijing affirmed that 
Vietnam "recognizes and supports" China's declaration and "respects this 
decision."&lt;40&gt; However, in May 1975, the China Department of the 
Vietnamese Foreign Ministry changed the stand and said that "The Truong 
Sa Islands (Nansha Islands) had been Vietnamese territory since ancient 
times."&lt;41&gt; In late 1975, a new territorial map of the reunited Vietnam for 
the first time included the Spratlys, and in May 1977 Vietnam specifically 
declared that its territorial waters included the Spratlys.

     The Philippines' claim is based on "discovery," "proximity," and 
"national security." The Philippine  claim started in 1947 when the then 
Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Garcia demanded that 
some islands of the Spratlys, which were occupied by Japan during World 
War Two and were used by Japan as a staging area to launch attacks on the 
Philippines, be given to the Philippines. In May 1956, Tomas Cloma, 
owner of a Philippine fishing vessel company and director of the Philippine 
Maritime Institute, explored the Spratlys together with his brothers and 40 
crew, and claimed to have discovered and occupied 53 islands and reefs of 
64,976 sq. nm in the Spratlys. They proclaimed "formal ownership" over 
them, hoisted the Philippine national flag and renamed these islands and 
reefs the Kalayaan (Freedomland) Island group. In his letter to Carlos 
Garcia, the then Philippine Vice President and Foreign Minister, Cloma 
asserted his occupation was based on "discovery and occupation." Garcia 
replied that judging from the point of "occupation" and "proximity," there 
are no reasons for these islands and reefs not to be under Philippine 
jurisdiction."&lt;42&gt; In April 1972, the Philippine government incorporated 
the Kalayaan group into Palawan Province as a municipality. In 1974, the 
Philippine government claimed that "Its location rendered it strategically 
important to Philippine national security."&lt;43&gt; In 1978, the Philippine 
Presidential Decree No. 1599 underscored the fact that Kalayaan is within 
the Philippine 200-mile exclusive economic zone. On the whole the 
Philippine claim extends over an area of 70,150 sq. nm,&lt;44&gt; which 
includes most of the larger islands in the Spratlys.

     Malaysia's claim on the Spratleys is more or less based on "proximity." 
Malaysia's claim "is based on the conviction that the islands are situated on 
its continental shelf, well within its declared exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ), security, and its proximity to the mainland."&lt;45&gt; By publishing on 
21 December 1979 a new map on its territorial waters and continental shelf 
boundaries, Malaysia has staked its claims to about a dozen tiny reefs and 
atolls in the southeastern portion of the Spratlys.

     According to foreign analysts, "Neither country's (the Philippines and 
Malaysia) claim can be said to be particularly well grounded in international 
law, which offers very few universal principles that could be said to 'govern' 
in a dispute of this kind."&lt;46&gt;

     Brunei's claim is also based on "proximity." I t  claims ownership on 
one reef called Louisa Reef (Canting Jail). But, proximity is not at all a 
ground for acquiring territory in international law. It contravenes 
international justice and peace. "In any case, there is no rule establishing 
ipso jure the presumption of sovereignty in favor of a particular state merely 
by virtue of the contiguity of the state to the territory in question."&lt;47&gt;

     Now the South China Sea has been filled with various overlapping sea 
boundaries. China drew in 1947 a nine-dashed intermittent line surrounding 
the Spratlys as its boundary line and has been kept up till now in China's 
maps. It encompasses the majority parts of the South China Sea, just 
offshore from the other littoral states. Hanoi declared its EEZ and 
continental shelf in May 1977, which includes as well the majority parts of  
the South China Sea.  As to the Philippines, apart from the Kalayaan group 
line, it claimed in June 1978 an EEZ covering the eastern part of the South 
China Sea. Malaysia claimed a continental shelf line in December 1979 and 
declared its 200 nm EEZ in May 1980, covering the southern part of the 
South China Sea. Brunei's Fishery Limits Enactment of 1982 declared a 
200 nm exclusive fishery zone for Brunei, which touches upon the extreme 
southern sector of the Spratly area. If Brunei declares a 200 nm EEZ 
around Louisa Reef, that zone would extend further into the Spratlys. 
Indonesia announced a seabed boundary line in October 1969 around the 
Natuna Island, and it overlaps with the claims of Vietnam and Malaysia. It 
declared a 200 nm EEZ in March 1980. Indonesia's offshore claims may 
bring Jakarta into potential conflict with the others because James Shoal is 
near the Natuna Islan.

===================================================
ANALYSES OF THE DISPUTES
===================================================

The present disputes embrace four issues related to international law in 
general and the law of the sea in particular.

----------------------------------------------------
BASELINE OF TERRITORIAL SEA

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 stipulates 
that, "Every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up 
to a limit not exceeding 12 nm." (Chapter 3) Since the territorial sea baseline 
is the starting point for measuring territorial sea, contiguous zone, 
continental shelf and EEZ, differences in respect of territorial sea baseline 
inevitably lead to disputes in maritime jurisdiction.

     The concept on territorial sea baseline in the law of the sea is rather 
vague, Depending on different geographical conditions, it might be a low-
tide line or a straight baseline. The low-tide line has been prescribed as the 
normal baseline in conventional and customary law. However, "In localities 
where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, the method of straight 
baseline joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the 
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." (Chapter 
7) Besides, the Convention also stipulates that an archipelagic state may 
draw a straight baseline to define the breadth of its territorial sea.

     The low-tide line is the normal baseline method which is accepted by all 
countries, "Each coastal state would seek to insure that the low-tide baseline 
of the other would not be drawn too seaward from the coast";&lt;48&gt; whereas 
the method of straight baseline easily arouses disputes, because countries 
are inclined to abuse its use to enlarge their own maritime jurisdiction.

     Countries concerned in the present disputes all adopt the method of 
straight baseline. The majority of these straight baselines are unilateral, and 
are not recognized by others.

     China adopts in its Territorial Sea Proclamation of 1958 and the Law of 
Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zones of 1992 the straight baseline 
system, "connecting base points on the mainland coast and on the 
outermost of the coastal islands"; however, it has not specified the base 
points. North Korea claimed territorial waters of 12 nm in August 1977 
adopting straight baseline, but has been unspecific with respect to the 
baseline. South Korea has specified its straight baselines with reference to 
its Territorial Sea Law of 1977. Japan proclaimed territorial sea 12 nm wide 
in July 1977 by adopting straight baseline.

     Vietnam declared its baseline of territorial waters on 12 November 1982. 
It adopts the straight baselines linking the farthest parts of the coast and the 
outermost points of offshore islands. "The system uses nine turning points, 
two of which are more than 80 nm offshore, while three others are more 
than 50 nm offshore. The four longest of the ten baselines are 162, 161, 
149, and 105 nm long, enclosing a water area of 27,000 sq. nm in all."&lt;49&gt; 
In doing so, it has met with protests from the other related countries. 
Thailand, for example, has stated that the drawing of baselines of 
Vietnamese territorial sea was " at variance with the well-established rules 
of international law."&lt;50&gt;

     Malaysia has used the straight baseline system. For instance, the baseline 
in the Straits of Malacca links the remote islands of Perak and Jarak, 
resulting in claims to territorial waters that in one place are 59 nm from the 
nearest fragment of Malaysian territory. The straight baselines in the vicinity 
of the mouth of Golok River between Thailand and Malaysia, and near 
Langkawi Island in the Andaman Sea, have adversely affected the maritime 
claims of Thailand. The segment passing through Langkawi Island extends 
the territorial sea of Malaysia to 30 nm from the land territory.&lt;51&gt;

     The former Philippine territorial waters, defined in the treaty between the 
U.S. and Spain in 1898, and the treaty between the United States and Britain 
in 1930, were drawn along meridian and parallel lines and shaped 
rectangularity. In 1961, the Philippines adopted delimitation in accordance 
with straight archipelagic baselines in place of the meridian and parallel 
lines.

     As a starting point for the settlement of the disputes, the countries 
concerned should first hold consultations and reach agreement on their 
baselines. As the three China Seas are narrow and are studded with offshore 
islands, for the convenience of boundary demarcation, it is preferable that 
the countries concerned in principle ignore the effects of offshore islands 
outside the belts of territorial sea on the baselines of territorial sea. 
Otherwise, the situation will be very complicated. 

     For example, the barren island  Dong Dao, exposed at low tide 70 nm 
off Shanghai, might complicate the delimitation in the East China Sea. 
"Using that uninhabited offshore island as the base point would affect one 
of the (South Korean) four points with very good promise of gas or 
oil."&lt;52&gt; The Sassuksan Island about 62 miles off the southwest coast of 
the Korean Peninsula would also complicate the delimitation in the Yellow 
Sea. If the island can be given full effect and the equidistance rule applies, it 
would give South Korea substantial advantage in delimiting its boundary 
vis-?vis China. The controversy between Japan and South Korea in the 
East China Sea originates from Japan's persistence, in the face of objections 
from South Korea, in using a group of uninhabited and isolated islets and 
rocks, called Danjo Gunto and Torishima as its base points for a claim on 
maritime jurisdiction between Japan and South Korea. 

     In the Bashi Channel, the Philippines draws its straight archipelagic 
baselines in the north from the outermost islands of Batan Islands and 
Babuyan Islands. The area of the two islands is 793 sq. km, and the water 
area within this archipelagic line is 12,996.78 sq. km. The water-land ratio 
is 16.39 to 1. Chapter 47 of the Law of the Sea Convention stipulates, "The 
ratio of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 
and 9 to 1." Evidently the Philippine straight archipelagic baselines have to 
recede to the northernmost points of Luzon Island.

----------------------------------------------------
PRINCIPLES OF CONTINENTAL SHELF DEMARCATION

The concept of continental shelf has long been a controversial issue. The 
relevant stipulation in the law of the sea has itself been under changes and is 
still not perfect. The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf adopted the 
200-meter depth criterion and the exploitability test. Later on the principle of 
natural prolongation of land territory was created in 1969 by the 
International Court in its judgment of the North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases, but this principle has yet to be defined precisely. The Third UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 adopts a new definition, and 
defines a 200 nm limit in place of the 200-meter depth criterion. It stipulates 
that the continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the seabed and subsoil 
of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the 
natural prolongation of its land territory to (1) the outer edge of  the 
continental margin, or (2) a distance of 200 nm from the baselines from 
which the territorial sea is measured, where the outer edge of the continental 
margin does not extend up to that distance. (Chapter 76:1)  This new 
definition, despite its intention to minimize conflict and eliminate ambiguity, 
is itself a source of new conflicts. The definition has complicated the 
maritime boundary issues in the three China Seas, because in these seas 
there are few spots where a 200 nm limit can be applied without 
overlapping with those of the other coastal states.

     During this evolutionary process, several tendencies are worth notice. 
One is "the relative demise of the natural prolongation concept and the 
emphasis on geographical circumstances and coastal configurations."&lt;53&gt; 
It seems that the doctrine of natural prolongation has been overridden by the 
200 nm limit regime and " is now somewhat discredited as a basis for 
continental shelf delimitation."&lt;54&gt;

     Another is the inclined ignorance of the factor of trough in affecting the 
shelf demarcation. Recent adjudications have tended "to reduce the 
relevance of geomorphological features such as the trough cited by 
China."&lt;55&gt; Under the regime of the 200 nm limit, "The Okinawa Trough 
could cease to be a limiting factor on Japan in the delimitation of the East 
China Sea continental shelf."&lt;56&gt;

     The third is the emphasis given to the application of the median or 
equidistance line for achieving an equitable solution in the interests of 
convenience. Although all countries agree that agreement through 
consultation precedes the median line and that the median line principle can 
be applied, it is only in the absence of an agreement, and unless justified by 
special circumstances, state practices have shown that they have all applied 
the method of equidistance as points of departure in the initial stage of 
negotiations and have made adjustments later on based on that. "Judicial 
and arbitral decisions, though have not yet regarded the equidistance rule 
having an obligatory force, nevertheless have endorsed its legal and practical 
value in just about all decisions."&lt;57&gt; For example, the Agreement on 
Continental Shelf Boundaries signed between Indonesia and Malaysia in 
1969 adopts the median line method in delimiting the maritime boundaries 
between West Malaysia and Indonesia, and the revised equidistant line 
method in delimiting the maritime boundaries between East Malaysia and 
Indonesia.

     In line with recent developments, the application of the equidistance 
principle, although not obligatory, could be decisive in the settlement of 
disputes in the China Seas in those instances where it could be applied 
equitably. The natural prolongation principle and the silt line claim ought to 
be reconsidered. The natural prolongation principle would be advantageous 
to China in the East China Sea, but would be disadvantageous to China in 
the Tonkin Gulf and the South China Sea. "China's use of the natural 
prolongation principle in the East China Sea vis-?vis Japan contradicts its 
opposition to Vietnam's use of this principle in the Gulf."&lt;58&gt; The silt line 
would be advantageous to China in the Yellow Sea, but would be 
disadvantageous to China in the Korea Bay and the East China Sea. 
Besides, it is better for a country to adopt the same principle for the 
convenience of its maritime delimitation. Otherwise the inconsistency 
would delay the settlement process. The practice such as the South Korea's 
insistence on the equidistance principle in the Yellow Sea on the one hand 
and the natural prolongation principle in the East China Sea has complicated 
the process. 

----------------------------------------------------
 THE OWNERSHIP OF ISLANDS

Most of maritime jurisdictional disputes are concerned with the ownership 
of islands, which is usually very difficult to solve.

     In respect to the sovereignty of the Spratly and the Senkaku Islands, 
various factors need to be taken into consideration. Among them, the 
historical title and the present status are most important.

     Speaking from historical title, China's claims are stronger than those of 
Vietnam and Japan. China discovered the Spratlys and the Senkakus 
hundreds of years before Vietnam and Japan respectively. The Vietnamese 
assertion that the Spratlys were an integral part of Vietnamese territory in 
1834 is short of proof. The Vietnamese assertion that in 1834 the Spratlys 
were under the reign of Emperor Minh Mang can not be justified because 
Vietnam was still a Chinese protectorate before 1875, and it was against 
logic and common sense that a vassal state could occupy a piece of territory 
of its suzerain state. The Japanese allegation that the Senkakus were 
discovered by Tatsushiro Koga in 1884 appears to have now faded away 
even in Japan.

     The interpretation of a historical treaty is inseparable from the historical 
background in which the treaty was signed. The "red line" defined in the 
1887 Sino-French Convention only indicates the ownership of the offshore 
islands between China and Vietnam without involving the delimitation of 
the Tonkin Gulf and the South China Sea. "It seems unlikely that this 
decision was intended to allocate to either China or Vietnam a maritime area 
of more than 3 nm from the coast, bearing in mind the 3 nm maximum 
breadth of the territorial sea at that time."&lt;59&gt; If Vietnam insists that it 
delimits the sea boundary in the Tonkin Gulf, then China might use it as a 
further proof  that the Spratlys belong  to China, because the Spratlys lie 
east of this red line.

     As to the Japanese annexation of the Senkaku Islands, it is closely 
related to its victory in the Sino-Japanese War and to the usurpation of the 
Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895. Japan hesitated to make its claim to the 
islands for ten years previously in fear of possible friction with China, 
despite repeated requests by the Okinawa Prefecture. This hesitation only 
ended on the eve of China's defeat in the War. The islands were ceded to 
Japan in 1895 simultaneously with Taiwan as part of the islands 
appertaining to Taiwan.

     The status of the present occupation of the islands is an important factor 
as well to be reckoned with in the settlement. Those islands and reefs which 
have already been occupied will not be unconditionally abandoned by the 
claimants concerned. But further occupation should be prevented, and who 
is occupying more islands at present should be irrelevant to the settlement. 
One has to admit "the improbability that any one country can hope to obtain 
the whole area."&lt;60&gt;

----------------------------------------------------
The Entitlements of Islands

The presence of islands is one of the major issues causing complication in 
boundary negotiation, because the geographical features of islands are so 
diverse that no single standard meets the common interests of the majority 
of states. The legal status of islands in the delimitation of maritime 
boundary has in fact not been fully resolved.

     The relevant stipulations in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea are rather vague and ambiguous. The Convention grants that islands 
may have territorial seas, contiguous zones, EEZs and continental shelves 
in the same way as land territory, but denies shelf and EEZ rights to "rocks 
which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own." 
(Chapter 121:3)  Difficulties then exist in identifying whether or not an 
island can sustain human habitation or economic life. In implementing the 
stipulations, countries are usually accustomed to interpret in the way which 
best suits their interests. None of the parties to the disputes would confine 
its interests to the physical value of the islands claimed, but would count on 
the economic value of what it might be entitled to. In enclosed or semi-
enclosed seas, even an obscure island large enough to qualify for a 
basepoint, could substantially affect boundary delimitation between or 
among the coastal states in favor of its owner.

      In state practices, there are generally three approaches to solving the 
presence of islands in maritime delimitation. "The first would be to draw a 
boundary ignoring the existence of islands; the second would give full effect 
to islands; and the third would give effect to islands depending on relevant 
factors such as distance from the coast, size, population, and economic and 
political development."&lt;61&gt; Most bilateral treaties ignore the effect of small 
islands in boundary delimitation. The question of whether islands should be 
ignored, given full effect, or given a limited  or partial effect, depends 
ultimately on the extent to which they are factors of inequity, and on the 
negotiations and the willingness of acceptability by the parties concerned. 
When Malaysia delimited its continental shelf in 1979, it disregarded the 
islands of others and their entitlements to a continental shelf. Malaysia 
simply drew equidistant boundaries, ignoring these islands altogether, and 
gave rise to a series of protests from its neighbors. 

     Regarding the Senkaku Islands, since they are small, uninhabited, and 
cannot sustain economic life of their own, they could only be given partial 
effect and are not entitled to have a continental shelf. Limiting the Senkaku 
Islands to only a 12 nm territorial sea would have no significant legal effects 
on the boundary delimitation in the East China Sea, thus making the 
settlement process much easier. The desirable approach is to agree to a 12 
nm territorial sea enclosure around the Senkakus.

  Regarding the Spratly Islands, one might divide them into several 
categories. The underwater banks, shoals, and cays which constitute the 
majority parts of the Spratly group should be ignored. Artificial islets in 
principle should be ignored, but those artificial islets with human occupation 
and habitation might be given partial effect and be entitled to have 12 nm 
territorial sea.  Those 33 islands and rocks which stand permanently above 
the sea level should all be entitled to have 12 nm territorial sea; and 26 
among them ,"being naturally formed areas of land surrounded by water 
and standing above high tide"&lt;62&gt; should be given full effect. "All of the 
26 islands of the Spratly group, may be used to make claims to territorial 
waters, contiguous zones, EEZs and continental shelves."&lt;63&gt;  At present, 
these islands with full effect have all been occupied by respective claimants.

     As China holds that the Spratlys have been an inalienable part of Chinese 
territory, for the delimitation of the continental shelf, China might take such 
islands as Itu Aba Island, Thitu Island, Flat Island, Nanshan Island, 
Commodore Reef, Swallow Reef, Amboyna Cay, Spratly Island as base 
points, draw straight lines connecting these base points in a rectangular 
form, and thus define the 200 nm continental shelf instead of the nine-
dashed intermittent line.

===================================================
EQUITABLE APPROACHES IN EXISTING INTERNATIONAL 
MARITIME BOUNDARY AGREEMENTS 
===================================================

The question of maritime boundaries is a newly-emerging issue. The 
previous lack of legal concern for delimiting the boundaries is mainly 
attributable to the fact that the seabed and subsoil have no human population 
warranting legal control and that the valuable resources they contain had not 
been within human control until recent times. The subject has assumed 
greater importance only in recent decades, as the new campaign for seaward 
expansion has resulted in the addition of the concepts of the continental 
shelf and the EEZ to territorial sea zones.

     The stipulations of the law of the sea regarding maritime delimitation are 
rather general. The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea provides that the 
delimitation of the continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent 
coasts shall be effected by agreement in conformity with international law. 
Such an agreement shall be in accordance with equitable principles, 
employing the median or equidistance line where appropriate and taking 
account of all circumstances prevailing in the area concerned. (Chapter 83:1)  
The International Court attaches a reasonable degree of decisive importance 
to the role of equidistance in the process of maritime boundary delimitation 
although it has ruled that, for achieving the most equitable solution, 
circumstances other than equidistant line also merit adequate consideration.

     Existing international ocean boundary agreements provide useful 
guidance for how to achieve an equitable solution. In these agreements the 
legal and practical value of equidistance principle has been endorsed. 
Though no boundary line plotted in these agreements could be qualified as a 
true equidistant line, an equidistant line is a good the 'starting point' for 
negotiation, for it does provide a point of reference  for by contracting states 
in their pursuit of fairness or equity. The equidistant line approach could be 
used by the littoral States in the three China Seas in seeking equitable 
solution to their disputes.

     There are now more than one hundred maritime delimitation agreements 
in the world signed bilaterally or trilaterally. Among them, there are about 
twenty agreements signed by related East Asian countries. Two agreements 
are in Northeast Asia, i.e., the Japan-South Korea Agreement Establishing a 
Continental Shelf Boundary and Agreement Concerning the Joint 
Development of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf (30 Jan. 1974); 
the others are in Southeast Asia. Indonesia, being an archipelagic country 
and much concerned over its maritime interests., has been most active in 
negotiating boundary delimitations with its neighboring countries.&lt;64&gt;

     The common characteristics of these existing agreements in the Asian 
region are: First, they were concluded between politically friendly 
governments whose good international relations contributed to enhancing 
the acceptability or the flexibility of the position of the other side. The good 
atmosphere in international relations and the willingness of leaders to 
compromise are significant to the success of the negotiations. What may 
seem to be a recognition of equitable considerations may in fact be an 
example of political compromise or of regional cooperation.

     Second, in accordance with the principle of equity, the delimitation 
methods usually employed are the median or equidistant line. The 'inequity', 
if any, of the delimitation is remedied through some modifications of the 
delimiting lines. While the equidistance method has been frequently used, 
states have not hesitated to deviate from the method if it does not produce 
an equitable result.

     Third, the unity of mineral deposits is preserved so as to avoid the risk 
of prejudicial or wasteful exploitation wherever a continental shelf boundary 
straddles a mineral deposit. An interim agreement of joint exploitation of 
the overlapping zone and the joint authority option tends to be preferred in 
State practice.

     Fourth, the balancing of all equitable considerations, rather than the 
reliance on one consideration to the exclusion of others, has been the best 
method of delimitation.

     The following is a more detailed analyses of the existing international 
agreements in achieving an equitable solution.

----------------------------------------------------
TERRITORIAL SEA BOUNDARY AGREEMENTS

----------------------------------------------------
Straight Baselines of the Coastal States

Although the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous zone 
and the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention "regard the use of straight 
baselines as being limited to exceptional geographical circumstances, and 
although few States have a coastline that is anywhere near as indented or 
fringed with islands as that of Norway, about half of the world's coastal 
States have in fact drawn straight baselines along all or part of their 
coast."&lt;65&gt; As shown between Malaysia and Indonesia, not long before 
the boundary negotiation began, Malaysia constructed its straight baselines, 
apparently intending to put itself on an equal footing in the division of the 
continental shelf with Indonesia which had previously drawn its own 
straight baselines. For similar reasons, France and Spain had to create their 
'artificial coast-lines' first before they delimited in 1975 their continental 
shelf line in the Bay of Biscay. Thus, concerned parties might first accept 
one another's straight baseline claims as starting points in the negotiation 
process.

----------------------------------------------------
Modified Equidistance Principle on the Territorial Sea 

State practice shows that while the equidistance principle has been used in 
most of territorial sea boundary agreements, in almost all these cases the 
principle has been modified. For example, the declaration signed by  
Denmark and Sweden concerning the boundaries in the Sund on 30 Jan. 
1932 adopted the equidistance principle in the northern and southern 
segments of the boundary line; however, the remaining part of the line was 
a result of negotiation for the benefit of navigation of these two states, and 
was not equidistant from the opposite shores.&lt;66&gt; The equitable 
consideration of the baselines apparently becomes more important when 
more than two states are trying to decide a common boundary intersecting 
point. The boundary agreements in the North Sea and the Persian Gulf area 
suggest that "In every such case, the common point is always a negotiated 
point, not settled by any mathematical formula."&lt;67&gt;

----------------------------------------------------
Different Treatments of Islands

The legal status of islands varies from case to case. In the agreement 
between the U.S. and Mexico on 23 Nov. 1970, the Mexican offshore  
island, Islas Los Coronados, was given full value in delimitation. In the 
agreement between Newfoundland (Canada) and St. Pierre and Miquelon 
(France) signed on 27 March 1972, four turning or terminal points among 
the nine total resulted from negotiation, some taking islands into account, 
some not. In the agreement between Indonesia and Singapore signed on 25 
May 1973, all islands were used as base points. Turning Point 5 was 
situated equidistantly between the Indonesian island of Batu Berhanti and an 
unnamed islet east of Pulau Sakijang Petepah of Singapore.

----------------------------------------------------
Economic Interests and Other Geographical Considerations

Economic interests represent the realities of the situation which may 
enhance the reasonableness or cogency of the drawing of territorial sea 
boundaries and coastal configurations relevant to the boundaries.  The 1975 
Gambia-Senegal Boundary Agreement takes into account the existence of 
the Allaheii River mouth between the adjacent coasts of the two states. The 
U.S. and Mexico adopted an interesting procedure of exchanging areas for 
the convenience of the fishermen of both states. Since the Mexican island 
Coronados was taken into account, the boundary line from the shore to the 
point where this island begins to affect the equidistant line was simplified 
by an equal exchange of territory. The recalculation of a terminal point on 
the line affected, i.e., the first point after leaving the land terminus, involved 
a transfer of 608,141 sq. m from Mexico to the U.S. and 608,139 sq. m 
from the U.S. to Mexico.&lt;68&gt;

----------------------------------------------------
Concession of Territorial Sea 

Sometimes a part of the territorial sea may be given up to obtain a 
successful boundary agreement. This happened in the narrow strait area 
delimitation agreement between Indonesia and Singapore. Five of the six 
turning points are found on the Indonesian side of the 'median line', and the 
second point even lies within the straight baseline of Indonesia, i.e., within 
the internal water area of Indonesia. In the Agreement of 20 May 1965 
between Finland and the USSR, the USSR had to accept a breadth of 
territorial sea of less than 12 miles in the Gulf of Finland.            

----------------------------------------------------
CONTINENTAL SHELF AND MARITIME ZONE BOUNDARY 
AGREEMENTS

Continental shelf boundary (CSB) agreements delimit only the sea-bed; and 
maritime zone boundary (MZB) agreements include the delimitation of 
both the sea-bed and the water column (usually referred to as economic or 
fishing zone), and the delimitation of water column only.

----------------------------------------------------
Simplification of the Boundary Lines 

The existing agreements have made efforts to make the final boundaries 
simple by either using the equidistance method or by negotiating non-
equidistant points in deciding the terminal or turning points of the boundary 
lines. For example, in the Netherlands-Federal Republic of Germany CSB 
Agreement (1 Dec. 1964) which contains a total of nine points, only five 
points are equidistant, and the other four points are negotiated non-
equidistant points. In the Brazil-Uruguay MZB Agreement (21 July 1972) 
and in the Senegal-Guinea Bissau MZB Agreement (26 April 1960), only 
one single straight line following an azimuth or a parallel has been 
designated as the boundary line.

     Seeking simplicity may involve an exchange of territory. In exchanging 
areas, the true equidistant line may often be used as a yardstick to obtain 
equal exchange. The France-Brazil MZB Agreement (30 Jan. 1981) effects 
an exchange of areas of approximate equivalence. In wider maritime areas, 
contracting States seem to choose fewer turning points and to be more 
willing to exchange territories for a simplified boundary line whereas in 
narrow straits or gulf areas, States tend to be more precise and to choose 
more turning points to construct a zigzag line. In the Portugal-Spain CSB 
Agreement (12 Feb. 1976), they simply set the northern line as the parallel 
of the 41( 51' 57" north latitude, and their southern line as the parallel of the 
7( 23' 48" west longitude. In the northern boundary area, Spain gives up 
some area; and in the southern boundary area, Portugal gives up some area. 
On the other hand, in the CSB agreement between Finland and the USSR 
on 20 May 1965, there are twenty-one turning or terminal points in the 
short line delimiting the narrow Gulf of Finland encompassed by  many 
off-shore islets of the two States.

----------------------------------------------------
Proportionality

Proportionality is one possible relevant factor to be used for correcting the 
distortions that arise from the use of a method that fails to take account of 
coastal configuration. Proportionality may take two forms: proportionality 
between the areas of continental shelf to the lengths of the respective 
coastlines, and proportionality as an overall test of equity. In the Australia-
Papua New Guinea MZB agreement (18 Dec. 1978), the boundary reflected 
a reasonable degree of proportionality between Papua New Guinea's coast 
and the Australian islands' coasts.&lt;69&gt; In the Federal Republic of 
Germany-UK CSB Agreement (25 Nov. 1971), due to the 'special 
circumstances' arising from the concavity of the coast of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, this agreement, together with pertaining agreements 
between the FRG and the Netherlands, gives the FRG about 12,000 sq. km 
more than it would otherwise have if the boundary between the three 
countries had been settled on the basis of the equidistance principle.&lt;70&gt;

----------------------------------------------------
Offshore Islands 

Offshore islands have sometimes been given full effect, sometimes limited 
effect (half-effect, or a one-third, or a one-quarter effect), and sometimes no 
effect at all in the boundary delimitation. There is no identifiable general rule 
for pre-assigning different values to different islands. It depends ultimately 
on the extent to which they are factors of inequity.

     Among the existing CSB and MZB agreements, there are quite a lot  
which give offshore islands full effect. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands 
in the Andaman Sea, which are about 600 nm from the Indian mainland, 
and Burma's Coco Islands, which are about 100 nm from the Burmese 
straight baseline, as well as another Burmese tiny island named Narcondam 
which is an uninhabited craterless, extinct volcano with an area of  7 sq. km, 
710 m above sea level, are all given full weight in drawing the median and 
equidistant boundary line in the April 1984 maritime boundary delimitation 
agreement between India and Burma.

     In some agreements, some islands are given full or partial effect and 
others are totally ignored. The Saudi Arabia-Iran CSB Agreement (24 Oct. 
1968) gives the Saudi island of Arabi and the Iranian island of Farsi the 12 
nm territorial sea respectively. Other off-shore islands are ignored. In the 
Qatar-Abu Dhabi CSB Agreement (30 March 1969), the island of 
Dayyinah, located at the boundary area, is given a 3 nm territorial sea, while 
other islets are given no effect at all.

     Several MZB agreements have given either partial or full effect to 
uninhabitable rocks, cays or atolls. In the Venezuela-Netherlands MZB 
Agreement (30 March 1978), Aves Island, despite its very small size and 
lack of habitation, was given full effect as a basepoint. Also, in the U.S.-
Cook Islands MZB Agreement (11 July 1980), uninhabited atolls-including 
Rose Island and Suvorov Island-are all given full effect as base points. The 
boundary line of the Columbia-Panama MZB Agreement (20 Nov. 1976) 
was also adjusted because partial effect was given to some uninhabited cays 
in the Caribbean Sea.&lt;71&gt; 

     A special related case is the Channel Islands dispute between France and 
Britain. The Court of Arbitration found that, because the Channel Islands 
were 'on the wrong side' of the median line between States with 'almost 
equal coastlines', 'close to the French coast', and  'wholly detached 
geographically ' from Britain, to divert the mid-channel median line would 
effect a 'radical distortion of the boundary creative of inequity'. It therefore 
enclaved the Channel Islands in a 12 nm shelf zone, within the French shelf, 
and retained the median line between the two States.&lt;72&gt;

----------------------------------------------------
Geomorphological Variations

Sea-bed physical characteristics are generally given serious consideration in 
the boundary delimitation. The final negotiated boundary of the Australia-
Indonesia CSB Agreement (Timor and Arafura Seas) (9 Oct. 1972) actually 
follows the continental slope bordering the Timor Trench. The location of 
turning points A12 to A16 relates primarily to the geomorphological 
provinces underlying the Arafura Sea.

     However, in several cases, prominent geomorphological variations are 
simply ignored. In both the Norway-UK CSB Agreement (10 March 1965) 
and the Sweden-Norway CSB Agreement (24 July 1968), the Norwegian 
Trough which has a depth of up to 371 fathoms was ignored. In the Spain-
France CSB Agreement (29 Jan. 1974), the Cape Breton Trench was 
disregarded.  In the Norway-Iceland CSB Agreement (22 Oct. 1981), a 
submarine depression between Iceland and Jan Mayen Ridge played no part 
in the delimitation. 

----------------------------------------------------
Economic Interests

The claims over the maritime zones are basically economy-oriented, and  
existing economic interests and known natural resources are eligible for 
consideration as criteria to be applied in the delimitation process. States, 
more often than not, adopt such a position by drawing a boundary line or 
lines with the existing drilling operations and sites remaining on the side of 
the concession-granting state, with some adjustment of the boundary line in 
some other place, if necessary, to compensate the other side.

     The Saudi Arabia-Iran CSB Agreement (24 Oct. 1968) is a modification 
of the median line agreement initiated by the two States on 13 December 
1965. The 1965 Agreement was never ratified because Iran apparently felt 
that the Agreement did not provide an equitable division of the sea-bed 
resources. This view predominated after new mineral resources (the 
Marjan-Fereydom deposits) were discovered in the northern zone of the 
1965 line. The revision of the 1965 line affected the northern segment of the 
boundary line between points 8 and 14. As Shigeru Oda, an ICJ judge, 
observed, the Saudi Arabia-Iran line "was actually drawn near the coast of 
Saudi Arabia in favor of Iran's claim. This was hardly a geographical 
median line, but it represented a solution based on the economic realities of 
equitable distribution of resources."&lt;73&gt;

     In the Qatar-Abu Dhabi CSB Agreement (30 March 1969), while points 
A &amp; D are equidistant, points B &amp; C are non-equidistant. According to the 
Agreement, Point B was designated to coincide with the location of an oil 
field (al-Bundug Well No. 1). The Agreement provides the oil field is to be 
shared equally. For economic reasons, both countries have stipulated that 
the development of the field is to be carried out by one concessionaire 
ADMA according to the terms of its concession with the ruler of Abu 
Dhabi. However, provisions were made for mutual consultation over the 
exploitation of the field and for equal sharing of all royalties, profits and 
other government fees due in respect of the oil field.

     In the FRG-Denmark CSB Agreement and the FRG-Netherlands 
Agreement (both on 28 Jan. 1971), existing structures and known resources 
played important roles in the delimitation. Certain exploration areas, which 
were licensed by the Netherlands and Denmark but had to fall on the FRG 
side of the new continental shelf line, were allowed to be continuously 
explored. A provision was made to permit the existing licensee to apply for 
a fresh license from the FRG government. Detailed provisions were also 
made regarding the unity of resources which extends across the boundary 
line.&lt;74&gt;

----------------------------------------------------
Historic Use of the Maritime Zones

State practice favors the recognition of historic rights in the drawing of 
maritime boundaries. The India-Sri Lanka Agreement on the boundary in 
Historic Waters (26 June 1974) preserves the traditional fishing rights of 
both parties. In the Australia-Papua New Guinea MZB Agreement (18 Dec. 
1978), specific provisions were made to secure the traditional activities and 
rights  of the inhabitants in the border area. A specific 'Protected Zone' was 
established according to the agreement, "to acknowledge and protect the 
traditional way of life and livelihood of the traditional inhabitants including 
their traditional fishing and free movement."&lt;75&gt;

----------------------------------------------------
Prior Agreement of the Other Party Required for Boundary Area 
Exploitation

The Canada-Denmark (Greenland) CSB Agreement (17 Dec. 1973) 
includes a provision which states that "Neither Party shall issue licenses for 
exploitation of mineral resources in the area bordering the dividing line 
without the prior agreement of the other Party as to the exact determination 
of the geographic coordinates of points of that part of the dividing line 
bordering upon the areas in question."&lt;76&gt;

     The Australia-Indonesia CSB Agreement (9 October 1972) provides 
that, if any single accumulation of liquid hydrocarbons or natural gas, or if 
any other mineral deposit beneath the sea-bed, extends across any of the 
boundary lines, the two governments will seek to reach an agreement on the 
matter in which the accumulation or deposit shall be exploited and on the 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from such exploitation.

----------------------------------------------------
Special Cooperative Exploitation Zone or Revenue Sharing Zone 

The Japan-South Korea CSB Agreement (30 January 1974) created a Joint 
Development Zone with 24,111 sq. nm. The Parties agreed to keep the 
agreement remaining in force for a period of at least 50 years. In total nine 
sub-zones are defined, in each of which exploration and exploitation of the 
reported potential mineral resources can be conducted by concessionaires of 
both States.&lt;77&gt; The Norway-Iceland CSB Agreement (22 Oct. 1981) 
established a 'Joint Venture Area' at the Jan Mayen Ridge area. 

     A revenue sharing case can be found in the Saudi Arabia-Bahrain CSB 
Agreement (22 Feb. 1958). The northern segments of the CSB line coincide 
with the border line of a special oil field area 'Fashtu bu Saafa Hexagon'. 
The special area is located totally on the Saudi Arabia side of the CSB line, 
under thorough jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the two opposite 
neighboring States agreed that the oil resources of this area should be 
developed as the Saudi Arabians saw fit, but revenues received from the 
exploitation of the petroleum should be evenly divided between the two 
states.

     It is noteworthy that in the special cooperation or revenue-sharing 
arrangements, state parties with 'economic superiority' are always the ones 
who give up more. In the Japan-South Korea case, most of the Joint 
Development Zone is located on the Japanese side of the hypothetical 
equidistant line. In the Norway-Iceland arrangement, most of the Joint 
Venture Area is located on the Norwegian side of the CSB line between 
Iceland and Jan Mayen. In the Saudi Arabia-Bahrain case, the whole area of 
Fashtu bu Saafa Hexagon is on the side of Saudi Arabia.

===================================================
==
OPTIONS FOR EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT
===================================================
==

The maritime jurisdictional disputes in the three China Seas, especially the 
Spratlys' disputes in the South China Sea, indeed are thorny issues facing 
the Asian-Pacific countries in post-Cold War era. They are so sensitive that 
they can easily arouse national sentiments; each claimant insists on its stand 
with more or less parochial nationalism. They are explosive and potentially 
detrimental to peace and stability in the region. However, the conditions for 
seeking settlements are being matured now. Economic development has 
become the primary task of each nation in the region, and with the 
exhaustion of land-based resources the need to explore and exploit offshore 
resources and to settle maritime disputes is increasing. Moreover, the 
normalization of diplomatic relations among  related claimants has 
achieved, and the improvement of political relations among them and the 
development of regional economic, political and security cooperation has 
provided great opportunities for accommodation in the settlement of 
disputes.

     To present, not a single country has made any concession on its claims, 
but flexibility does exist. In the final analysis, the disputes have to be 
resolved in a spirit of mutual accommodation. At present each side is trying 
to strengthen its claims and presence to have a better bargaining position in 
the future negotiations. In November 1994, China reached an agreement 
with Vietnam to set up a joint working team for seeking a settlement on 
maritime disputes between them, which is a step forward in breaking the 
present deadlock.

     Several proposals have now and then been put forth regarding the 
Spratlys' settlement. The prevalent one at present is the Indonesian proposal 
known as the 'Doughnut Formula'. The formula "would divide the South 
China Sea in the shape of an elongated doughnut by projecting 320-
kilometer (equivalent to 172.8 nm) exclusive economic zones from the 
shores of the littoral states"; it would "put a large portion of China's claims 
on hold"; and "only the hole in the doughnut-the middle of South China 
Sea, including the main islands of the disputed Spratly chain-would be 
discussed by competing claimants as an area for potential joint economic 
development."&lt;78&gt;The rationale for the Indonesian proposal is that since 
the littoral states of the South China Sea would not agree to have joint 
development in their respective exclusive economic zones, the best area for 
starting joint development is the middle part of the South China Sea. That is 
how the Doughnut Formula came to be.

     The problem is that the Indonesian proposal only considers the interests 
of the littoral states without taking into account the interests of China which 
holds a well-grounded historic title over the Spratly Islands. The proposal 
satisfies the claims of the other states, not only having their own EEZ, but 
also by participating in the joint development in the middle part. But where 
is China's share? Is it fair that China has nothing of its own and would only 
be one of the partners in the middle part? From China's perspective, this 
proposal is inequitable and thus is unfeasible.

     Another proposal worth notice is the "allocation scheme" put forth by 
some scholars. Under the scheme, 'the Philippines could get the northeast 
portion, extending from Marie Louise Bank in the north to Half Moon 
Shoal in the south and to Southampton Reefs in the west . . . Vietnam and 
China could get jointly the western cluster, extending from Trident Shoal in 
the north to Cay Marino in the south and eastward to Ladd Reef . . . This 
area could perhaps be further divided between Vietnam and China along a 
latitude north of Fiery Cross Reef. The southern part of the area where 
Philippine and Malaysian claims overlap could be allocated in several ways. 
Vietnam might get the western part, including Amboyna Cay and Stag 
Shoal. Alternatively, the entire area . . . could be allocated to 
Malaysia."&lt;79&gt;

     The problem is that this scheme is inequitable as well because it fails to 
take into full account the interests of all claimant states. Although under the 
scheme China has a portion around Itu Aba Island in the northern part of 
the island group, the portion is too small in comparison with Vietnam's 
portion in consideration of the much stronger historic title China has vis-?
vis Vietnam.

     In seeking an equitable solution to the Spratley disputes, the interests of 
all claimant countries, including those of China, must be taken into 
consideration, and all relevant factors such as historic title, island 
entitlements, continental shelf rights, proportionality, geomorphological 
features, and economic interests balanced in the delimitation. The following 
might be taken as working parameters for settlement of disputes:

Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei would have their own EEZ 
and continental shelf, though with necessary adjustments.

China, in giving up its nine-dashed intermittent line and its "historic waters" 
claims in the South China Sea, would own the middle part of the South 
China Sea in a rectangular form (Thitu Island to the north,  Amboyna Cay 
to the south, Nanshan Island and Commodore Reef to the east, and Spratley 
island to the west), and claim a continental shelf by taking these islands as 
base points for straight lines connecting them.

In overlapping areas, the equidistant line method would be applied for 
delimitation. Where this solution was disagreeable bi-or trilateral 
development would be arranged.

     International law requires that maritime delimitation between 
neighboring States must be effected by the application of equitable criteria 
practical methods capable of ensuring, with respect to the geographical 
configurations of the area and other relevant circumstances, an equitable 
solution . It is hoped that an equitable, objective and workable formula 
might be soon worked out.

     Based on existing state practices, there are options for the settlement of 
maritime jurisdictional disputes in the three China Seas.

     Option one is that each claimant makes due adjustments in its claims and 
negotiates with each other for an equitable solution on the boundary 
delimitation in a spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation 
based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. With the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea becoming effective now, at least all sides 
have a common and unified criterion, and they might make respective 
adjustments based on the Convention and might engage in friendly 
negotiations taking the related stipulations in the Convention as starting 
points.

     First, they might reach a consensus on whether to adopt the equidistance 
principle for continental shelf demarcation, as well as on the criterion 
regarding the entitlements of islands in the three China Seas.

     Second, as the sovereignty of the disputed islands will be difficult to 
tackle, they could let the disputes be shelved without affecting the overall 
relations, and go on to negotiate an agreement on the continental shelf 
demarcation. For example, in the case of the Senkaku Islands, by agreeing 
that the islands are only entitled to have 12 nm territorial sea, China and 
Japan could enclose or enclave the islands with their 12 nm territorial sea, 
and leave the area unsettled without affecting their continental shelf 
demarcation in the East China Sea.

     Third, they could start the negotiation process from cases easier to 
handle before proceeding to difficult cases. As the disputes in the Yellow 
Sea and the East China Sea are relatively simpler than those in the South 
China Sea, China, North Korea, South Korea and Japan might work 
together for the settlement there. Experiences gained and confidence built 
therein would be helpful in the settlement of the more complicated cases. 
Even in the South China Sea, the disputes in the Tonkin Gulf are much 
easier to handle than the disputes in the Spratly Islands. Once China and 
Vietnam settle their disputes in the Tonkin Gulf, it would for sure facilitate 
the process of settlement in the Spratlys, as China and Vietnam are the 
major claimants for the Spratlys.

     Option two is to work for joint development in the disputed areas. 
Though this is not the permanent solution to the problem, but only an 
expedient measure in the transitional period towards the final equitable 
settlement, it is indeed a practical and feasible approach, and the preferred 
alternative to no action.  All parties could reap the benefits from the 
resources pending the final boundary settlement. What is meant by joint 
development is that the contracting parties are prepared to shelve the 
disputes within a specified period by making certain concessions and that 
the establishment of the joint development area would not affect the stand 
adopted by any country on the permanent delimitation of their maritime 
boundaries. The countries could continue to negotiate the boundary during 
the period of joint development. Such an approach would reassure investors 
who would otherwise be discouraged from investing due to the risks of 
economic and political instability resulting from the jurisdictional disputes 
over the areas in question.

     In order to reach an agreement on joint development, related parties need 
to specify first their claims and their overlapping areas; and then work out 
arrangements for joint assessment of resources, joint development 
program, joint sharing of profits and losses, and joint scientific cooperation 
and environmental prevention in the overlapping areas. At the early stage, 
geological and geophysical research usually cannot be site-specific. It tends 
to be regional before acreage acquisition and exploratory drilling are 
recommended on the probability that oil deposits are present in a specific 
geographic area.

     The selection of areas  as starting points on experimental zones for joint 
development is of importance to the confidence-building and to the 
improvement of atmosphere among claimants and to the final negotiated 
boundary settlement. Apart from joint exploitation of fishery resources, 
areas with promising recoverable oil and gas deposits should be given 
priority in consideration.

     In the Yellow Sea, the central basin is surrounded by good prospective 
areas, and oil exploration has been going on both sides of the hypothetical 
equidistant line. The employment of a joint venture or joint development 
seems easier to be arrange here.

     In the East China Sea, the South Korea-Japan Joint Development Zone 
is believed to have good petroleum resources. As China is reported to have 
drilled wells on its western end, a trilateral joint development might be 
arranged. In the southern East China Sea, the overlapping areas between 
China's and Japan's `claims have good prospects for oil and gas in the 
northern two-thirds and in the southwestern corner, and the latter is just 
north of the Senkaku Islands. As China has drilled successful gas wells 
adjacent to an equidistant line, and Japan's block system extends beyond an 
equidistant line, joint development could be suitable and effective here. 
There is a precedent for joint oil undertakings by the two countries in the 
Bohai Bay.

     In the Tonkin Gulf, both China and Vietnam have now refrained from 
exploratory activities in the neutral zone. If an agreement on the delimitation 
of the Gulf can not be reached between them in the near future, a joint 
development program could be easily worked out either in the neutral zone 
or in the area lying between the equidistant line and the 1987 meridian, both 
east and west of it.

     While it will take time to solve the Spratly Islands sovereignty issue, 
efforts should be made on joint development arrangements by the claimant 
parties. In view of the fact that seabed areas near Reed Bank, Vanguard 
Bank, North and South Luconia Shoals are known to have extractable oil 
fields, these areas are desirable  for joint development arrangements.

     Insofar as China's Taiwan is concerned, since it maintains a on maritime 
boundary claims identical to China's, arrangements could be made between 
them. The issue of joint development in the South China Sea and in the East 
China Sea might be included in the talks between  the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait. But world countries should make clear that its recognition of 
the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China carries with it 
recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate representative of China's 
seabed claims.

     High technology is needed for the exploration and exploitation of seabed 
oil and gas reserves, and at present this is beyond the reach of most of the 
claimant States. Thus joint development warrants the participation and 
cooperation of foreign oil companies, and the setting up of international 
consortia and  administrative mechanism for managing joint development 
activities needs to taken into consideration. In the initial stage, the joint 
authority could be simply a liaison body for reconnaissance exploration. 
When renaissance exploration gives favorable indication, then an operator 
or a foreign oil company which may have agreements with the claimants 
could be chosen. The areas could be subdivided into blocks of agreed size 
and number, and lots could be drawn for exploration or exploitation rights 
in each area.

     In the case of Vanguard Bank in the Spratlys, at present many U.S. and 
Western oil companies are involved in oil exploratory activities respectively 
with China and Vietnam. A U.S. Crestone oil drilling company signed in 
1992 a contract with China for oil exploratory activities in 25,000 sq. km in 
the Wan'an Bei-21 area, which is just east of a prospecting concession 
awarded by Hanoi in 1994 to a consortium led by United States firm Mobil. 
In mid-1994 Vietnam delivered two economic-technological service 
stations to Vanguard Bank, and hired VietSovpetro to drill for oil in the 
Crestone concession. Vietnam has further signed a contract with some 
Western companies including a Norwegian oil company  to conduct oil 
prospecting there. In addition, a consortium including Mobil Sekiyu ( a 100 
percent owned Japanese subsidiary of Mobil Oil Corporation of the U.S.) 
and several Japanese oil companies have a financial stake in Blue Dragon-a 
highly prospective structure let by Vietnam but also claimed by China. 
Mobil has a three-well commitment for Blue Dragon and China's Ministry 
of Geology is itself planning to drill the Blue Dragon structure.&lt;80&gt; 
Actually, these foreign oil companies could play a positive role in 
encouraging and promoting China and Vietnam to reach an agreement on 
joint development in this area.  

     A good example of joint development is the Timor Gap, a zone of 
overlapping claims having turned into a zone of cooperation. The 250-km 
Timor Gap was left undelimited in the 1971-72 Indonesia-Australia 
continental shelf boundary agreement as East Timor was then a Portuguese 
colony. Since Indonesia annexed it in 1975-76, Indonesia and Australia 
have faced the problem of the boundary delimitation in this 'gap'. Australia 
argues that two continental margins are involved: the broad Australian 
margin to the south and the narrow Timor margin to the north, each 
separated by the Timor Trough, which descends to a depth of 3,200 meters 
in places. Indonesia, on the other side, has refuted the existence of such a 
natural divide by counter-claiming that there is only one continental shelf 
connecting the two territories, and that the Timor Trough is a mere 
depression in this continuous feature. Indonesia has proposed the median 
line, equidistant from the two shores as the solution. If Australia accepts 
Indonesia's argument, it would lose thousands of square kilometers of 
promising recoverable oil and gas deposits.&lt;81&gt;

      Both sides finally decided to sign the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation 
Treaty in late 1990. The treaty establishes a long-term provisional regime 
for joint development in the zone. It divides the zone into three subzones: 
namely Area A in the middle, which will be jointly developed by Australia 
and Indonesia, Area B in the south by Australia and Area C in the north by 
Indonesia. Zone A is divided into 14 working contract areas each 
measuring around 2,500 square kilometers. "Any oil and gas production 
from Area A will be shared by the two nations on an equal basis. Indonesia 
will get 10 percent of Australia's gross resources rent tax on the oil and gas 
development in Area B, while Australia will receive 10 percent of the 
income tax collected by Indonesia from contractors operating in Area 
C."&lt;82&gt; In December 1991 they agreed to give a contract for exploring oil 
in Zone A to a consortium of 11 companies with a total investment of U.S. 
$362.32 million.&lt;83&gt;  

     Another example is the Malaysian-Thai agreement to jointly explore and 
exploit oil and gas resources in the Gulf of Thailand signed on 22 April 
1994 after 14 years of negotiations and talks. It has paved the way for the 
launching of oil explorations at the 7,250 square kilometer area, which both 
countries are claiming. The Malaysian-Thailand Joint Authority established 
by them is "to serve as a mechanism to explore and exploit petroleum 
resources in the area pending a final resolution of the claims."&lt;84&gt;

     Option three is to accept third-party assistance for the settlement of the 
disputes when the issues are deadlocked and when there is no hope of a 
compromise between the claimant States themselves. Third-party assistance 
may after all be accepted as one way of settlement and would be better than 
indefinite procrastination.

     Third-party assistance in the settlement of the disputes is not the same as 
'internationalization' of the disputes. They are two different concepts. 
'Internationalization' of the disputes means intervention by foreign countries 
for their own interests; whereas third-party assistance means third-party 
involvement in seeking an equitable and peaceful settlement.

     In the international community,  third-party involvement in a dispute 
settlement may take several forms: the adjudication by the International 
Court of Justice; the arbitration by a tribunal or an arbitrator; and  the 
mediation by a conciliation commission or a conciliator.

     The International Court of Justice, a successor to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice since 1945, has played a significant role as a vehicle to 
promote international law of maritime delimitation. The disadvantage is that 
the parties are not wholly free to determine the composition of the Court, 
the judges being elected for nine-year terms by the UN General Assembly 
and Security Council. "However, each party to a dispute has a right to 
appoint a judge of its choosing if there is no judge of its nationality on the 
bench;  and furthermore , the parties may agree to put the dispute before a 
chamber of the Court in which case, as was decided in the Gulf of Maine 
Case where such a procedure was used,  the parties may choose which of 
the judges shall constitute the chamber."&lt;85&gt; The adjudications by the 
Court have binding force, and so far they have been equitable in general as 
shown in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases in 1969, the Case 
Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) in 1982; the Case 
Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) in 1985. The States who 
voluntarily submit themselves to such a binding procedure will be bound 
regardless of their reaction to the result. This is an effective way of securing 
without dispute a right and entitlement which would not otherwise be 
forthcoming.

     Asian countries are not accustomed to appeal to the International Court, 
and are usually deterred from resorting to judicial fora with binding 
decisions for fear of results which may be unpredictable or detrimental to 
their national interests. But with their growing international interactions, 
they might reconsider and change their stand.

     For those not wishing to accept the International Court's adjudication, an 
ad hoc arbitral tribunal of their own choice might be a better option. In the 
procedure of arbitration, parties to the disputes are free to select the 
arbitrators and to jointly determine the tribunal's composition and terms of 
reference; and arbitration depends upon the willingness of related parties to 
agree to and participate in the arbitration.

     Finally, the procedures of mediation and conciliation could serve as a 
most useful approach to assist the process of direct negotiation and to 
achieve the more equitable solution of boundary disputes. The conciliation 
commission (or single conciliator) may base its recommendations not only 
on legal principles and precedent for equitable boundary delimitation, but 
also on pragmatic, factual findings ensuring the equity of the resolution. For 
example, the famous Norway (Jan Mayen)-Iceland Continental Shelf 
Agreement was reached in accordance with the recommendation of a 
conciliation commission; and the disputes over the Beagle Channel between 
Argentina and Chile, which lasted for 150 years, were finally settled in 1984 
through third-party mediation.

     One suggestion worth considering is the formation of an Eminent 
Persons Group to take an active role in mediating a resolution to the 
Spratlys dispute. Such a group might consist of distinguished 
representatives who are friendly and acceptable to all claimants, and serve as 
high-level mediators to induce a peaceful settlement.

     No matter which option is chosen by the claimants, on the way towards 
the settlement of the disputes, all parties should jointly be committed to 
maintain the status quo by refraining from any military and economic 
activities so as not to further complicate the situation,  to renounce the use of 
force to avoid confrontation, and to guarantee the security and freedom of 
navigation in the sea-lanes in these seas. 

     It is hoped that with the atmosphere much improved and with the mutual 
confidence much increased, the parties in disputes over maritime 
jurisdiction in the three China Seas will soon join hands to negotiate 
equitable solutions to the disputes in a spirit of cooperation and mutual 
accommodation.

===================================================
NOTES
===================================================

* Ji Guoxing is a professor of political science and director of the Asia-
Pacific Department at Shanghai Institute for International Studies, and was a 
fellow at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and 
Cooperation from November 1994 to October 1995. The author is grateful 
to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) for supporting this project. 
The opinions expressed here are those of the author, and do not reflect the 
views of USIP or IGCC.

1 Mark J. Valencia, ''Northeast Asia: Petroleum Potential, Jurisdictional 
Claims, and International Relations'," Ocean Development and International 
Law, Vol. 20, 1989, p. 48, claims between one and ten billion bbl.; older 
sources claim up to sixteen billion bbl. "Based on the graben type of basin 
and a general petroleum content of 15,000 to 150,000 barrels per  mi3, the 
basin could contain up to 16 billion barrels of oil." Willums, Jan-Olaf, 
''China's Offshore Potential," paper presented at the Workshop on the 
Geology and Hydrocarbon Potential of the South China Sea and 
Possibilities of Joint Research and Development, East-West Center, 
Honolulu, 5-12 August 1980.

2 "Based on natural prolongation, China is convinced that the seabed 
boundary lies closer to the Korean Peninsula than it does to the Chinese 
coast." J.R.V. Prescott,''Maritime Jurisdiction in East Asian Seas," the 
East-West Environment and Policy Institute,Occasional Paper, No.4, East-
West Center, 1987, p. 51.

3 Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 23, 1970, p. 884.

4  The median and equidistant line principles are premised on the idea that if 
contested sea boundaries overlap, regardless of undersea geological 
features, the median distance between the shorelines of the outermost land 
territories of the contesting nations shall be taken as the definitive boundary 
between them. Strictly speaking, "equidistant lines" are precise devisions 
based upon equal division of lines between paired points at the same latitude 
or longitude (as applicable) on opposing shores, while "median lines" are 
drawn after an imaginary smoothing of rough coastal edges. However, the 
terms are often used interchangeably, and only in extremely contentious 
cases in which the very slight divergences between the two could have any 
significant economic or strategic impact is there a useful distinction between 
them.

5 Douglas M. Johnston and Mark J. Valencia, ''Pacific Ocean Boundary 
Problems, Status and Solutions" (the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1991),  p. 116.

6 Ibid

7 J.R.V. Prescott, op. cit., p. 51.

8 Choon-ho Park, Dalchoog Kim, Seo-Hang Lee edited, ''The Regime of 
the Yellow Sea Issues and Policy Options for Cooperation in the Changing 
Environment," the Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, 
1990, p. 40.

9 Mark J. Valencia, op. cit., p. 48.

10 Ibid.

11 ''Statement by the Chinese Minisrty of Foreign Affairs, 13 June 1977," 
Beijing Review, 17 June 1977, p. 17.

12 Harrison, Selig S., ''the Taiwan Issue and Seabed Petroleum 
Development in the East China Sea," paper for the Conference on Current 
Issues in East Asia, held at St. John's University in Jamaica, New York, 25 
October 1985.

13 Mark J. Valencia, op. cit., p. 47.

14 Ibid, p. 50.

15 Choon-ho Park, ''East Asia and the Law of the Sea," Seoul National 
University, 2nd edition, 1985, p. 11.

16 Xinhua Monthly, Beijing, 11 Feb. 1974.

17 ''Statement of PRC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 Dec. 1971,'' Beijing 
Review, 1 Jan. 1972, p. 13.

18 For full historical background and analysis, see Ji Guoxing, ''the 
Diaoyudao (Senkaku) Disputes and Prospects for Settlement," The Korean 
Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. VI, No. 2, Winter 1994, pp. 285-311.

19 Choon-ho Park, ''Continental Shelf Issues in the Yellow Sea and the 
East China Sea," Law of the Sea Institute ,University of Rhode Island, 
Occasional Paper, No.15, 1972, p. 41.

20 See J.R.V. Prescott, op. cit., p. 54 55.

21 Gerald W. Berkley, ''the Issue of  Sovereignty over Diaoyudao," paper 
for the 34th International Congress of Asian and African States, University 
of Hong Kong, 23-27 August 1993.

22 Mark J. Valencia, op. cit., p. 47.

23 Ibid,  p. 48.

24 Ibid,  p. 55.

25 Han Nianlong et al.., ''Diplomacy of Contemporary China," (Hong 
Kong: New Horizon Press, 1990) p. 335.

26 Ibid.

&nbsp;
&nbsp;
27 La Grange, Carolyn, ''South China Sea Disputes," Working Paper No.1 
(Honolulu: East-West Center Environment and Policy Institute, 1980).

28 Han Nianlong et al., op. cit., p. 336.

29 Douglas M. Johnston and Mark J. Valencia, op. cit., p. 149.

30 Joseph R. Morgan and Mark J. Valencia edited for the East-West 
Environment and Policy Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii, ''Atlas for Marine 
Policy in Southeast Asian Seas" (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1983), p. 50.

31 Choon-ho Park, Jae Kyu Park ed., ''The Law of the Sea: Problems from 
the East Asian Perspectives" (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Law of the 
Sea Institute, 1987), p. 465. 

32 Joseph R. Morgan and Mark J. Valencia edited, op. cit., p. 115. 

33 Ibid, p. 50.

34 Choon-ho Park, Jae Kyu Park edited, op. cit., p. 459. 

35 Han Nianlong et al., op. cit., p. 331. 

36 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, ''The Law of  the Sea and Maritime Boundary 
Delimitation i n Southeast Asia," Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 141. 

37 Document by the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 30 January 
1980.

38 Choon-ho Park, ""East Asia and the Law of  the Sea," p. 212.  Cited 
from 'Fact Sheet', No.2/74, South Vietnam Embassy, Washington DC, 28 
January 1974.

39 Han Nianlong et al., op. cit., p. 332.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid, p. 333.

42 Cheng Hurng Yu, ''The South China Sea Islands, Sovereignty and 
International Conflicts," You Shi Cultural Enterprise Co., Taipei, 1987, p. 
83-85.

43 Neil Frank R. Ferrer, ''The Philippinesand the South China Sea Islands: 
Overview and Documents," Center for International Relations and Strategic 
Studies, Foreign Service Institute, the Philippines, CIRSS Papers No.1, 
December 1993. p. 12.

44 BA Hamzah, ''The Spratlies: What Can Be Done to Enhance 
Confidence," ISIS Research Note, Malaysia, 1990.

45 Ibid.

46 Douglas M. Johnston and Mark J. Valencia, op. cit., p. 127. Cited from 
Ariff, M.O.,''The Philippines' Claim to Sabah: Its Historical, Legal and 
Political Implications," Oxford University Press, 1970.

47 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, op. cit., p. 141.

48 Choon-ho Park, Dalchoog Kim, Seo-Hang Lee edited, op. cit., p. 41. 

49 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, op. cit., p. 16 17. 

50 Ibid, p. 182.

51 Ibid, p. 18.

52 Choon-ho Park, Jae Kyu Park edi., op. cit., p. 261 262.

53 David Joseph Attard, ''The Exclusive Economic Zone in International 
Law," Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 275.

54  Douglas M. Johnston and Mark J. Valencia, op. cit., p. 166.

55 Ibid, p. 165.

56 Choon-ho Park, "East Asia and the Law of the Sea," p. 258.

57 Surya P. Sharma, ''Delimitation of Land and Sea Boundaries between 
Neighbouring Countries," Lancers Books, India, 1989, p. 117.

58 Douglas M. Johnston and Mark J. Valencia, op. cit., p. 149.

59 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, op. cit., p. 43.

60 Douglas M. Johnston and Mark J. Valencia, op. cit., p. 124.

61 David Joseph Attard, op. cit., p. 261.

62 J.R.V. Prescott, op. cit., p. 51.

63 Ibid.

64 The first agreement was concluded between Indonesia and Malaysia on 
27 Oct. 1969. This was followed by the agreement of 18 May 1971 
between Indonesia and Australia establishing certain sea-bed boundaries; 
the Indonesia-Thailand Agreement of 17 Dec. 1971; the Indonesia-
Thailand-Malaysia Agreement of 21 Dec. 1971; the Indonesia Australia 
Agreement of 9 Oct. 1972 in the area of the Timor and Arafura Sea;  the 
Indonesia-Singapore Agreement of 25 May 1973 stipulating the territorial 
sea boundary lines; the Indonesia-India Agreement of 8 Aug. 1974; the 
Indonesia-Thailand Agreement in the Andaman Sea on 11 Dec. 1975; the 
Indonesia-India Agreement on 14 Jan. 1977 relating to the extension of the 
continental shelf boundary in the Andaman sea and the Indian Ocean; the 
Indonesia-India-Thailand Agreement of 22 June 1978 delimiting the seabed 
of the Andaman sea off the western entrance of the Straits of Malacca. On 
that date, Thailand also concluded a seabed boundary agreement in the 
Andaman Sea with India, separating India's Nicobar Islands and the Thai 
coast by a series of median lines.

65 Kuen-Chen Fu, ''Equitable Considerations in Maritime Boundary 
Agreements, An Analysis," Soochow Law Review, Taipei, Vol. 6, No. 1, 
Feb., 1989, p. 140.

66 Office of the Geographer, U.S. Department of  State, ''Limits in the 
Sea," No. 26, 16 July 1970.

67 Kuen-Chen Fu, op. cit., p. 142.

68 Office of the Geographer, op. cit., No. 45,  11 Aug. 1972.

69 David Joseph Attard, op. cit., p. 258.

70 Office of Geographer, supra note 2, No. 10, Revised, 14 June 1974.

71 Office of  Geographer, Gulf of Maine Case, Annex Vol. 1 to the 
Canadian Reply, supra note, at 29, 31, 33.

72 David Joseph Attard, op. cit., p. 262.

73 Oda, ''International Law of the Resources of the Sea," 127, Hague 
Recueil 445 (1969-11).

74 Office of Geographer, supra note 2, No. 10, Revised, 14 June 1974.

75 Office of Geographer, Gulf of Maine Case, Annex Vol. 1 to the 
Canadian Reply, supra note 17, at 529-602.

76 Office of Geographer,  ''Limits in the Sea," No. 72, 4 Aug. 1976.

77 Ibid, No. 75, 2 Sept. 1977.

78 Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 August 1994, p. 18.

79 Douglas M. Johnston and Mark J. Valencia, op. cit., p. 125-127.

80 Offshore, Vol. 54, No. 7, July 1994, p. 14.

81 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, op. cit., p. 80.

82 Jakarta Post, 13 Dec. 1991.

83 Indonesian Observer, 13 Dec. 1991.

84 New Straits Times, 22 April 1994.

85 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, ''The Law of the Sea," Manchester 
University Press, 1988, p. 333-334.
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